Valuing Identity by James, Osamudia R.
University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review
2017
Valuing Identity
Osamudia R. James
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.
Recommended Citation
James, Osamudia R., "Valuing Identity" (2017). Minnesota Law Review. 84.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/84
  
127 
Article 
Valuing Identity 
Osamudia R. James†  
  INTRODUCTION   
Identity—race, gender, and sexuality—is having a moment, 
both good and bad. Black Lives Matter, a movement initiated in 
response to state-sanctioned violence committed against Blacks, 
is fueled by a demand that the lives of black people in the United 
States be valued and dignified.1 Gay, lesbian, and transgender 
communities have built an advocacy network grounded in a com-
mitment to queer identity that resulted in support from the fed-
eral government.2 Celebrities can successfully drop “visual al-
bums” centered exclusively on the experiences of Southern black 
women and still enjoy a debut at number one on music charts.3 
 
†  Professor of Law and Vice Dean, University of Miami School of Law. I 
extend a special thank you to Charlton Copeland, who generously provided de-
tailed, insightful feedback and suggestions on this Article, during both early 
and late stages of the project. I am also grateful for feedback and commentary 
received from Aziza Ahmed, LaToya Baldwin, Mario Barnes, Anastasia Boles, 
Paul Butler, Caroline Corbin, Paul Gowder, Patrick Gudridge, Darren 
Hutchinson, Kamal James, Daniel Ibsen Morales, Andres Sawicki, Robin 
Walker-Sterling, Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Russell Robinson, faculty at Wake 
Forest College of Law, attendees at the Miami-Emory 2014 Vulnerabilities and 
Human Condition Conference on Vulnerabilities and Identities, the 2015 Duke 
Law Culp Colloquium, UCI Law’s Symposium on Merit and Identity in Higher 
Education, Duke University’s Conference on the Present and Future of the Civil 
Rights Movement, and the 2016 Lutie A. Lytle Black Women Law Faculty 
Workshop. This Article is for Big K and Little K, in whom I instill self-love in a 
world that insists otherwise. Copyright © 2017 by Osamudia R. James. 
 1.  See infra notes 152–56 and accompanying text. 
 2. Loretta E. Lynch, U.S. Attorney Gen., Press Conference Announcing 
Complaint Against the State of North Carolina to Stop Discrimination Against 
Transgender Individuals (May 9, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/ 
attorney-general-loretta-e-lynch-delivers-remarks-press-conference 
-announcing-complaint. 
 3. Lizzie Plaugic, Beyoncé’s Lemonade Debuts at No. 1 on the Billboard 
Charts, VERGE (May 1, 2016), https://www.theverge.com/2016/5/1/11552580/ 
beyonce-lemonade-no-1-billboard-charts. 
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From social justice movements anchored by race to artistic ex-
pression centering legacies of pain and pleasure that shape our 
racial, cultural, and geographic senses of self, identity is on the 
rise as a tool that animates both self-affirmation and liberation. 
At the same time, identity is prompting severe backlash. 
From the “All Lives Matter” slogans developed in response to the 
fight against police brutality to the ambitious calls for universal-
ity in the law, identity politics is characterized as undemocratic, 
exclusionary, and harmful to minoritized4 identities. Having 
closed the identity cannon in equal protection, the Supreme 
Court refused to reopen it when presented an opportunity to do 
so in the 2015 same-sex marriage cases. The Court’s latest rejec-
tion of identity, however, is only the most recent in a line of legal 
pronouncements that not only present colorblindness as a legal 
framework to which society should aspire, but also insist that 
race has increasingly little to do with contemporary legal or so-
cial problems. In this post-race legal world, racial identity is im-
poverished and problematic, and the insistence of plaintiffs and 
scholars on examining conflicts through a racial lens is not only 
misplaced, but socially, politically, and legally counterproduc-
tive. Prominent legal scholars sympathetic to identititarian 
frameworks have had to surrender to the Court’s disengagement 
with identity.5 
The law’s rejection of identity is out of step with the current 
cultural buzz but consistent with longer-held notions about the 
problematic nature of racial identity in general, and blackness, 
in particular. Narratives about the stigmatizing or essentializ-
ing nature of identity are not new, and much of the Court’s op-
position to racial classifications is grounded in anxieties about 
the inherent harms of racial identity. Through both colorblind 
legal ideology and the outright denial of the salience of race in 
social conflict, legal jurisprudence doubles-down on notions of 
blackness as impoverished, even as the law implicitly affirms 
white racial identity.  
 
 4. Some societal groups are positioned as outsiders to dominant norms 
and are thus perceived to fall short of dominant group standards. When this 
deviation is the basis for exclusion, some groups are privileged, and others mi-
noritized. See Debra A. Harley et al., Race, Class, and Gender: A Constellation 
of Positionalities with Implications for Counseling, 30 J. MULTICULTURAL 
COUNSELING & DEV. 216, 216–17, 228–30 (2002). The term “minoritized” is pref-
erable to “minority” as the phenomenon is affirmative and can occur regardless 
of numerical proportion in society. 
 5. See infra notes 193–96 and accompanying text. 
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Although post-identity and universal legal frameworks are 
increasingly embraced by scholars and jurists as the logical al-
ternative to identity, universality imposes significant harms on 
minoritized communities. Post-identity and universal frame-
works undermine the race-conscious solutions that more effec-
tively dismantle institutional and structural discrimination, and 
miss opportunities to capitalize on race in ways that maximize 
democratic participation and inclusion. Moreover, capitulation 
to narratives that ignore identity is harmful not just to plaintiffs 
of color before the court, but to entire populations subject to legal 
solutions that destroy solidarity and community among people 
of color.  
Identity gets the legal and social job done. In this time of 
identity circumscription, this Article argues that identity politics 
are not just a vehicle for anti-discrimination claims, but also a 
positive social good. As a social good, identitarian frames are 
central to proper democratic recognition in the United States, 
reflecting both a political and social resilience, and embodying 
essential notions of dignity for minoritized groups. By recon-
structing racial identity in the law more positively, courts can 
step away from decision-making informed primarily by concerns 
about stigma or essentialism, making way for more effective re-
sponses to racial subordination and clear-eyed assessment of the 
universal equality movements poised to usurp identity. 
In arguing for the retention of identity frameworks, this Ar-
ticle uses black racial identity as an exemplar for an alternative 
lens through which law and policy might engage race in the pub-
lic sphere. Black racial identity is the focus both because of its 
significance in informing broader political attempts to secure 
justice and equality, and because black racial identity has long 
been perceived in the United States as debilitating.6 Accord-
ingly, the black-white racial binary is centered not only because 
of the urgency with which dignity for black lives is currently be-
ing championed across the country, but also because of the foun-
dational ways in which that particular binary has shaped other 
forms of oppression.7 
 
 6. See Paul Gowder, Racial Classification and Ascriptive Injury, 92 WASH. 
U. L. REV. 325, 328 (2014) (discussing a racial hierarchy in the United States in 
which Blacks, by virtue of being at the bottom of the hierarchy, are the hierar-
chy’s starkest victims). 
 7. See Roy L. Brooks & Kirsten Widner, In Defense of the Black/White Bi-
nary: Reclaiming a Tradition of Civil Rights Scholarship, 12 BERKELEY J. 
AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 107, 110 (2010) (affirming the black-white binary as provid-
ing “important context in the ongoing political and academic discourse on race,” 
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Using equal protection doctrine and case studies, Part I fo-
cuses on the Court’s denial of racial conflict and the value of ra-
cial identity. This denial is part of a legal shift that is only am-
plified by post-racial or universal equality constructs that embed 
asymmetric treatment of white and non-white racial identity. In 
response to this shift, Part II presents race as resilience, arguing 
that racial identity can operate usefully and positively in social, 
political, and legal spaces. Using this more constructive notion 
of racial identity, Part III then reframes the purported harms of 
racial classifications and interrogates our responses to struc-
tural discrimination as informed by impoverished notions of 
identity. Part IV closes with initial thoughts about what a re-
newed understanding of the value of black racial identity means 
both for other identity groups in America and the concept of iden-
tity more generally going forward. 
I.  DEVALUING IDENTITY   
Identity can be understood as a person’s internal sense of 
self, as well as an association of that self with a particular group 
or groups.8 Identity and association with a particular group is 
shaped by multiple social categories, including gender, religion, 
ethnicity, and race.9 Racial categories yield racial identities, 
and, thus, identification with racial groups. Although there is no 
biological basis for race,10 race does exist as a social construct11 
 
without diminishing the “very real and important needs and experiences of 
other subordinated groups”); see also Rogelio A. Lasso, Some Potential Casual-
ties of Moving Beyond the Black/White Paradigm to Build Racial Coalitions, 12 
WASH. & LEE J. C.R. & SOC. JUST. 81, 86 (2005) (arguing that “the enslavement 
of Blacks by Whites has certainly shaped our history more than any other single 
event,” and that understanding the origins of racism as a method to rationalize 
the enslavement of African Blacks is essential in order to understand racism 
toward all people of color). But see Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary Par-
adigm of Race: The “Normal Science” of American Racial Thought, 85 CALIF. L. 
REV. 1213, 1213–15, 1221 (1997) (arguing that, although slavery and white rac-
ism against Blacks is at the core of American history and society, omitting other 
groups in the struggle for civil rights distorts history and further contributes to 
the marginalization of non-black people of color). 
 8. See Kenneth L. Karst, Myths of Identity: Individual and Group Por-
traits of Race and Sexual Orientation, 43 UCLA L. REV. 263, 266, 282–83 (1995). 
 9. See id. at 288, 314 n.226. 
 10. See Ian F. Haney López, The Social Construction of Race: Some Obser-
vations on Illusion, Fabrication, and Choice, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 11 
(1994) (“There are no genetic characteristics possessed by all Blacks but not by 
non-Blacks; similarly, there is no gene or cluster of genes common to all Whites 
but not to non-Whites.”). 
 11. Professor Neil Gotanda has described four meanings of race, including: 
(1) status-race, a now discredited conception of race that indicates social status; 
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that is continually12 developed according to both social meanings 
and physical attributes.13 In addition to being signaled through 
phenotypic characteristics like skin color, hair texture, and facial 
features, race can also be conveyed by an individual’s social char-
acteristics like class, geography, and political affiliation.14 Racial 
identity is also performed in a strategic and social constructivist 
manner15 and subject to both internal navigation and external 
imposition.16  
 
(2) formal-race, which refers to socially constructed formal categories like 
“black” or “white” that are understood as neutral, apolitical descriptions merely 
reflecting skin color or country of ancestral origin; (3) historical-race, which em-
bodies past and continuing racial subordination; and (4) culture-race, which re-
fers to a group’s culture, including shared beliefs and social practices. Neil Go-
tanda, A Critique of “Our Constitution is Color-Blind”, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3–4 
(1991). 
 12. See D. Wendy Greene, Title VII: What’s Hair (and Other Race-Based 
Characteristics) Got to Do with It?, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 1355, 1365–70 (2008) 
(arguing that the concept of the “immutability” of race defies society’s actual 
understanding of race, both historically and contemporarily). 
 13. See Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Undercover Other, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 873, 
883 (2006) (footnote omitted) (“[R]ace, while often signaled by phenotype, is not 
biologically defined . . . . Instead, race is socially constructed; it is formed 
through human interactions and commonly held notions of what it means to be 
a person of a certain race.”). 
 14. Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On 
Being “Regarded As” Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha 
and Jamal Are White, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1283, 1293–94 n.42, 1296. 
 15. In the context of race, racial identity performance must correspond to 
symbolic representations that are culturally understood as evocative of a par-
ticular racial identity. Camille Gear Rich, Performing Racial and Ethnic Iden-
tity: Discrimination by Proxy and the Future of Title VII, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1134, 
1180 (2004) (applying Butler ’s performativity concept to the performance of race 
and ethnicity); see also Devon W. Carbado & Mitu Gulati, Working Identity, 85 
CORNELL L. REV. 1259, 1265 n.11 (2000) (citing JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT 
MATTER, at x–xi (1993)) (explaining that there is a distinction between identity 
performed as a result of social construction and identity performed as a strategic 
decision given the constraints linked to a particular context); Nancy Leong, 
Identity Entrepreneurs, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 1333, 1334 (2016) (“[O]ut-group 
members leverage their out-group status to derive social and economic value for 
themselves.”). 
 16. Internally, individuals assign themselves a racial identity, or identities, 
based on the particular group with which they most closely associate; although, 
this assignment is navigated by people with varying levels of freedom or choice, 
and is socially constructed through negotiations and renegotiations with the 
people of whom one interacts. See Christopher A. Ford, Administering Identity: 
The Determination of “Race” in Race-Conscious Law, 82 CALIF. L. REV. 1231, 
1239 (1994) (discussing the two approaches of racial and ethnic classification, 
including “self-reported identity” and “other-ascribed identity”); see also KEN-
NETH KARST, LAW’S PROMISE, LAW’S EXPRESSION 287 (1993) (asserting that creat-
ing and maintaining social identity is a process of negotiation between oneself 
and others); Claire A. Hill, The Law and Economics of Identity, 32 QUEEN’S L.J. 
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Identity is also the cornerstone of modern equality jurispru-
dence in the United States. The Equal Protection Clause man-
dates that “no State shall . . . deny to any person within its juris-
diction the equal protection of the laws.”17 Ratified by the states 
during Reconstruction in 1868, the Fourteenth Amendment en-
compassed a specific intent to abolish the Black Codes, the 
southern states’ attempt to negate the Thirteenth Amendment’s 
prohibition of slavery by targeting Blacks for unequal treatment 
in labor, land ownership, and criminal penalties.18 Just four 
years later, the Supreme Court, cognizant of the doctrine’s com-
mitment to African Americans, interpreted the Fourteenth 
Amendment’s “pervading purpose” as securing the “freedom of 
the slave race, the security and firm establishment of that free-
dom, and the protection of the newly-made freeman and citizen 
from the oppressions of those who had formerly exercised unlim-
ited dominion over him.”19 Justice Miller, writing for the major-
ity, further noted that the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth 
Amendments were all specifically intended to “address the griev-
ances of race.”20 
Despite the liberatory origins of identity, scholars, jurists, 
and laypersons have expressed concern regarding the centrality 
of identity and racial identity, in particular, in our equality and 
anti-discrimination jurisprudence. From the tactical21 and doc-
trinal22 weaknesses of an identitarian regime to the potentially 
disempowering social messages identity sends,23 identity is often 
 
389, 393 (2007) (discussing the economics model of identity, focused on the util-
ity-driven choices that individuals make based on their own identity, as well as 
influence from others). 
 17. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 18. JED RUBENFELD, REVOLUTION BY JUDICIARY: THE STRUCTURE OF 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 41 (2005). 
 19. Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 71 (1872). 
 20. Id. at 71–72. But see Jessica Knouse, From Identity Politics to Ideology 
Politics, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 749, 769–70 (2009) (arguing that the Thirty-ninth 
Congress which ratified the Equal Protection Clause also intended to institute 
an equal-birth principle, prohibiting discrimination of categories beyond race). 
 21. Tactical critiques of identity suggest that identitarian claims are vul-
nerable to legal or political challenge long-term because they balkanize groups 
by appearing to award benefits or protection to particular groups at the expense 
of others. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Universalism and Civil Rights (with Notes 
on Voting Rights After Shelby), 123 Yale L.J. 2838, 2847–55 (2014). 
 22. See infra notes 24–31 and accompanying text. 
 23. Scholars have expressed concern that identity has a tendency to essen-
tialize individuals, especially when legal claims based on discrimination against 
the identity marker are presented. See Kenji Yoshino, The New Equal Protec-
tion, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 795 (2011); see also Lauren Sudeall Lucas, Essay, 
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perceived in social, political, and legal discourse as problematic. 
The result has been an increasingly accelerated shift to anti-clas-
sification legal regimes, and the denial of the significance of mi-
noritized racial identity all together. At the same time, white ra-
cial identity, understood to be a non-racialized baseline, is 
implicitly affirmed. 
A. LEGAL DOCTRINE HOSTILE TO RACE  
Hostility towards identity as a vehicle to substantive equal-
ity is already reflected in the equal protection doctrine. Courts 
have extended tiered levels of scrutiny that provide more or less 
rigorous interrogation of governmental classifications based on 
identity to a limited number of racial and ethnic groups, women, 
and children of non-marital parentage,24 while ultimately deny-
ing it to gays and lesbians, the poor,25 and the disabled.26 
 
Identity as Proxy, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1605, 1621–22 (2015). Other scholars 
have focused on the messages identitarian frames send to identity holders, 
themselves. See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 
1707, 1731–37 (1993) (arguing that whiteness provides social and psychological 
benefits to Whites, who are buoyed by the sense of superiority that whiteness 
confers by virtue of its monopoly on political, legal, financial, and social power). 
Wendy Brown has argued that, “insofar as [identity politics] are premised on 
exclusion from a universal ideal, [politicized identities] require that ideal, as 
well as their exclusion from it, for their own perpetuity as identities” and “iden-
tity structured by this ethos becomes deeply invested in its own impotence, even 
while it seeks to assuage the pain of its powerlessness through its vengeful mor-
alizing, through its wide distribution of suffering, through its reproach of power 
as such.” Wendy Brown, Wounded Attachments, 21 POL. THEORY 390, 398, 403 
(1993). 
 24. Black racial identity, in particular, was an initial protected class under 
the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Court later extended legal solicitude to 
other identity groups that have been targets for exclusion and discrimination, 
including groups that have been saddled with disabilities, subjected to a “his-
tory of purposeful unequal treatment,” relegated to “a position of political pow-
erlessness as to command extraordinary protection from the majoritarian polit-
ical process,” “subjected to discrimination,” or “exhibit obvious, immutable, or 
distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group.” Bowen v. 
Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 602–03 (1987); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodri-
guez, 411 U.S. 1, 28 (1973); see Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) 
(recognizing Japanese Americans as a suspect class); see also Knouse, supra 
note 20, at 776–77 n.120 (noting that suspect class status has typically been 
extended to racially-premised groups (e.g., Japanese, Chinese, Mexicans, and 
aliens)). 
 25. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 411 U.S. at 28–29, 39 (declining to use a strict scru-
tiny standard when families living in poor school districts challenged the fund-
ing scheme of Texas public schools). 
 26.  See Knouse, supra note 20, at 778. 
 134 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:127 
 
Combined with the Court’s enduring insistence that equal 
protection rights are guaranteed not to groups, but to individu-
als,27 Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence has precluded an 
anti-subordination or distributive justice model of equal protec-
tion, which would impose on the state an affirmative duty to dis-
mantle unequal conditions between racial groups created by his-
torical systems of domination or inequities.28 An anti-
subordination model would also permit, without regard to con-
clusively established intent, challenges to policies that reinforce 
political, social, or economic marginalization of historically dis-
advantaged groups.29 
The rejection of an anti-subordination model has resulted in 
formal, rather than substantive, equality, where both benign 
and invidious racial classifications are subject to the same forms 
of judicial scrutiny by the Court. Based on this reading of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Court has preserved facially neu-
tral laws with disparate impact on minority groups as long as 
discriminatory intent cannot be found, while prohibiting race-
conscious government policies with a specific intent to amelio-
rate racial inequality.30 This approach to equality has eroded 
 
 27. See City of Richmond v. J. A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 493 (1989) (quot-
ing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 22 (1948)) (“[T]he ‘rights created by the first 
section of the Fourteenth Amendment are, by its terms, guaranteed to the indi-
vidual. The rights established are personal rights.’”).  
 28. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on Grounds Other 
Than Race”: The Inversion of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection 
Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 615, 622–24. Absent an intent requirement, 
a prima facie case for relief under a distributive justice theory of equal protec-
tion would be established whenever one racial or ethnic group is substantively 
worse off than another. Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal 
Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 345 
n.115 (1987). 
 29. Mario L. Barnes & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Once and Future Equal 
Protection Doctrine?, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1059, 1066–76 (2011) (concluding that 
although it is impossible to completely understand what equality meant in a 
society that simultaneously freed slaves but nevertheless socially subordinated 
Blacks, it is possible to conclude that: (1) the conflicted nature of the history of 
the reconstruction amendments requires a normative or moral standard for 
equality; and (2) to the extent that the amendments not only undid the Consti-
tution’s textual acceptance of slavery, but redefined Blacks as citizens, substan-
tive, and not just formal, equality must follow). 
 30. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
551 U.S. 701, 747 (2007) (striking down controlled-choice plans that sought to 
integrate public schools and broaden access of minority students to high-quality 
schools, because the racial identity of students was explicitly considered in mak-
ing school assignments). 
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protections against racial discrimination in labor and employ-
ment, education, criminal justice, and many other spheres of 
American life.31 
B. JUDICIAL COMMITMENTS TO IGNORING RACE 
In addition to its formal equality jurisprudence, the Court 
has also signaled a waning commitment to thinking about racial 
identity as it informs societal inequality. Judicial pronounce-
ments regarding the salience of identity in general, and black 
racial identity in particular, are increasingly jurispathic,32 re-
jecting race as the lens through which legal actors might assess 
obstacles to substantive societal equality. 
Key desegregation cases, for example, illustrate an outright 
impatience with long-term commitments to race-conscious pro-
gramming. In Board of Education of Oklahoma City v. Dowell, 
the Court endorsed the termination of desegregation orders once 
school districts became unitary, even if termination would lead 
to resegregation of schools.33 One year later, in Freeman v. Pitts, 
the Court gave federal courts the authority to relinquish super-
vision of school district desegregation in incremental stages, not-
withstanding the resulting likelihood that district students 
would never attend fully integrated systems.34 
In higher education, the Court has consistently refused to 
acknowledge societal discrimination against minorities as a com-
pelling interest that might justify the consideration of race in the 
admissions process.35 Instead, the Court embraced diversity, cit-
ing its potential to enhance classroom discussion and prepare 
 
 31. See id. (striking down controlled-choice plans that used race as one fac-
tor to facilitate racial integration in public schools); City of Richmond, 488 U.S. 
at 485–86 (holding that societal discrimination was insufficiently compelling as 
a justification for Richmond’s set-aside program for minority business enter-
prises); McClesky v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 287–91 (1987) (upholding the Georgia 
death penalty, despite conclusive evidence showing that, even after taking ac-
count of nonracial variables, defendants charged with killing white victims were 
4.3 times more likely to receive a death sentence than defendants charged with 
killing black victims). 
 32. Courts are jurispathic in their role when choosing between two or more 
laws or imposing a hierarchy upon laws (e.g., deciding that federal law trumps 
state law). Here, the courts are actively rejecting or “killing” law and policy that 
affirms the salience of racial identity in legal and policy attempts to secure ra-
cial equality. For more on jurispathic courts, see Robert M. Cover, Foreword: 
Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 40–44 (1983). 
 33. Bd. of Educ. of Okla. City v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237, 249–50 (1991). 
 34. Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 489–90 (1992). 
 35. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 310 (1978) (“[T]he 
purpose of helping certain groups whom the faculty of the Davis Medical School 
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students for the labor force, leadership, and citizenship.36 In the 
Court’s 2007 Parents Involved opinion concerning K–12 integra-
tion, Justice Roberts made the Court’s impatience with race and 
remedy quite explicit, striking down race-conscious integration 
plans while asserting that “[t]he way to stop discriminating on 
the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.”37 
The Court’s decisions in key voting rights cases also serve 
as examples of the Court’s increasing discomfort with under-
standing or recognizing subordination of minoritized racial iden-
tity, particularly when that understanding necessitates the 
recognition of accompanying white supremacy. In Shaw v. Reno, 
for example, Justice O’Connor’s opinion relied heavily on aspira-
tions of colorblindness, resorting to the automatic conclusion 
that racial classifications are necessarily harmful, inevitably 
“balkaniz[ing] us into competing racial factions” and “carry[ing] 
us further from the goal of a political system in which race no 
longer matters.”38 Justice O’Connor then proceeded to declare 
unconstitutional a reapportionment scheme that she character-
ized as “an effort to segregate voters into separate voting dis-
tricts because of their race.”39  
In dismissing appellees’ suggestions that the revised plan 
was necessary to avoid dilution of black voting strength in viola-
tion of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act, Justice O’Connor drew 
on “recent black electoral successes [that] demonstrate[d] the 
willingness of white voters in North Carolina to vote for black 
candidates.”40 She further noted that several state leaders, in-
cluding Speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives, 
were Black, and that only a few years earlier, a black candidate 
 
perceived as victims of ‘societal discrimination’ does not justify a classification 
that imposes disadvantages upon persons like respondent . . . .”). Although 
raised again in subsequent cases, the claim has never gained traction with the 
Court. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 323–25 (2003). 
 36. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 330–32. A coalition of intervenors argued that 
universities’ excessive reliance on standardized tests was at the heart of a racial 
caste system that excluded Blacks and Hispanics from competitive colleges and 
universities, perpetuating de facto segregation in public schools and discrimi-
nation in the workforce. Tomiko Brown-Nagin, Elites, Social Movements, and 
the Law: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436, 1458–61 
(2005). Despite this intervention, their claims were not addressed in the Court’s 
opinion. See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 306. 
 37. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701, 748 (2007). 
 38. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 657 (1993). Racial classification, however, 
is not necessarily and inevitably harmful to democracy. See infra Part II.B. 
 39. Shaw, 509 U.S. at 658. 
 40. Id. at 656. 
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defeated a white opponent in a Democratic Party runoff for the 
Senate before being “defeated narrowly” by a Republican incum-
bent in the general election.41 Justice O’Connor ignored, how-
ever, observations made by dissenting Justices that the plan 
had, in fact, allowed North Carolina to send its first black repre-
sentative to the United States Congress since Reconstruc-
tion42—a fact that belies any suggestion that white supremacy 
was so diminished as to provide no compelling justification for 
race-conscious voting reapportionment. 
More recently, Shelby County v. Holder illustrates the ea-
gerness with which the Court is committed to dismissing race as 
the proper lens through which to assess inequality, particularly 
if it cannot be supported with intentional and egregious exam-
ples of racial subordination. In the case, the Court struck down 
as unconstitutional section 4 of the Voting Rights Act, thus nul-
lifying the coverage formula that dictated which states had to 
obtain preclearance before making changes to their voting 
laws.43 In doing so, the Court again relied heavily on the sugges-
tion that race relations no longer warranted the sort of checks 
that section 4 provided, noting that black voter turnout in some 
of the covered states exceeded white voter turnout,44 that “[b]lat-
antly discriminatory evasions of federal decrees are rare,”45 and 
that “minority candidates hold office at unprecedented levels.”46 
Moreover, although Congress relied on “thousands of pages of 
evidence” before reauthorizing section 4, the Court ultimately 
suggested that the “pervasive,” “flagrant,” “widespread,” and 
“rampant” discrimination needed to justify maintaining the pre-
clearance formula was simply not before the Court.47 
Justice Ginsburg’s dissent, however, detailed ongoing voting 
discrimination in the form of second generation barriers that at-
tempt to diminish the impact of minority votes rather than 
blocking access to the ballot directly, including racial gerryman-
dering, at-large voting systems, and annexation of majority-
white residential areas.48 Nevertheless, the majority pressed on. 
In choosing to strike down a race-conscious voting policy because 
 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 659 (White, J., dissenting). 
 43. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013). 
 44. Id. at 2625. 
 45. Id. at 2631. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. at 2629. 
 48. Id. at 2634–35, 2640–42 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
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racial subordination did not present itself as obviously or typi-
cally as it did during the Civil Rights era, the Court communi-
cated a belief that voter suppression targeted against Blacks can 
be addressed through means that do not require the considera-
tion of race; the Court wants to address racial injustice without 
actually engaging race. 
C. ASYMMETRY AND UNIVERSALITY 
By ignoring race, however, the Court also implicitly centers 
whiteness in ways that reinscribe, rather than dismantle, racial 
hierarchy.49 Black racial identity is currently preserved in the 
law through a deficit lens. In contrast, white racial identity is 
understood to be a non-racialized baseline, embedded so deeply 
as to be barely detected at all. Decentering identity in the move 
to universal frameworks only further facilitates the already ex-
isting entrenchment of both (negative) black and (positive) white 
identity in the law.  
1. Entrenched Black Deficit  
Black American culture and identity are often fetishized, 
presented, and perceived in popular culture as exciting, exotic, 
or exclusive. Rachel Dolezal, for example, a white woman who 
had successfully presented herself as Black, seemed motivated, 
in part, by a belief that only such a ruse would give her access to 
black professional and cultural spaces.50 Dolezal’s attraction is 
mirrored in popular perceptions of black artistic work. In her re-
search about perspectives on black culture, for example, Baz 
 
 49. See infra notes 50–92, 176–85 and accompanying text. 
 50. Although the NAACP maintains that black racial identity is not a pre-
requisite for leadership, some commentators wondered whether Dolezal would 
have risen to president of the local chapter if she had been white. Jamilah 
Lemieux, The Infallibility of Miss Ann (Or, the Last Rachel Dolezal Thinkpiece 
Ever), EBONY (June 15, 2015), http://www.ebony.com/news-views/last-rachel 
-dolezal-thinkpiece-ever-065 (noting that Dolezal, in serving as NAACP chapter 
president and an Africana studies professor, occupied some of the few leader-
ship roles afforded to black people and gained access to black professional and 
cultural spaces); Press Release, NAACP Statement on the Resignation of Rachel 
Dolezal (June 15, 2015), http://www.naacp.org/latest/naacp-statement-on-the 
-resignation-of-rachel-dolezal1 (“The NAACP is not concerned with the racial 
identity of our leadership but the institutional integrity of our advocacy.”). 
Moreover, Dolezal was able to produce and sell “black art,” and booked public 
speaking engagements as a professor of African American studies, ostensibly 
aided by her presentation as a black woman. Kirk Johnson, Richard Pérez-Peña 
& John Eligon, Rachel Dolezal, in Center of Storm, is Defiant: ‘I Identify as 
Black’, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/17/us/ 
rachel-dolezal-nbc-today-show.html. 
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Dresinger interviews artists who describe black culture as “irre-
sistible,” “vital,” “life-giving,” and “productive.”51 Moreover, 
white artists and celebrities have been criticized for appropriat-
ing black culture to broaden their market appeal and capitalize 
on the exoticism associated with non-white identity.52 
The law, however, characterizes black racial identity as val-
uable far less often, consistently presenting black racial identity 
as impoverished. A famous example of this phenomenon is the 
case of Brown v. Board of Education, where the Court relied on 
social science purportedly affirming the inferiority complex of 
young black children to justify declaring school segregation un-
constitutional.53 At no point, however, did the Court interrogate 
the mental pathology and sense of unjustified superiority that 
develops among white schoolchildren as a result of the racial hi-
erarchy that school segregation supported. Rather, segregation 
was deemed unacceptable on the basis of conclusions regarding 
internalized inferiority and self-hate among black children. 
In reality, when selecting white dolls over black ones, the 
young children tested in the studies on which the Brown Court 
relied signaled to the researchers that they had already observed 
patterns of white supremacy around them, and knew which doll 
was perceived as “more desirable” by greater society. The devel-
opmentally accurate interpretation of the doll tests is not that 
 
 51. BAZ DREISINGER, NEAR BLACK: WHITE-TO-BLACK PASSING IN AMERI-
CAN CULTURE 4 (2008). 
 52. This is not to say that white artists who play black music cannot be 
legitimately interested in the art forms, nor that black artists have never en-
joyed commercial success in arts forms typically thought of as “White.” See, e.g., 
RAY CHARLES, MODERN SOUNDS IN COUNTRY AND WESTERN MUSIC (ABC-Par-
amount Records 1962); DARIUS RUCKER, LEARN TO LIVE (Capitol Records Nash-
ville 2008). Due to racial power dynamics, however, the latter is more accurately 
characterized as cross-cultural sharing, rather than appropriation. For com-
mentary on the politics of cultural appropriation, see Adrienne Keene, Opinion, 
The Benefits of Cultural ‘Sharing’ Are Usually One-Sided, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/08/04/whose-culture-is-it 
-anyhow/the-benefits-of-cultural-sharing-are-usually-one-sided (arguing that 
“borrowing” of cultural elements are not just equal cultural exchange, but a 
more “insidious, harmful act that reinforces existing systems of power”); Sally 
Kohn, How the Kardashians Exploit Racial Bias for Profit, WASH. POST (Nov. 
18, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/11/18/the 
-kardashians-arent-just-trashy-theyre-dangerous (arguing that non-black 
women have a history of appropriating black women’s bodies and culture and 
exploiting the fetishization of women of color for their own material gain). 
 53. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954) (“To separate them from 
others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a 
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect their 
hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.”). 
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children were saying “I know I am of lesser value”—a message 
children of the age tested are not yet capable of internalizing—
but rather “I know that the correct answer, as informed by what 
I observe, is to pick the white doll.”54  
Faulty conclusions regarding black self-hate, however, went 
virtually unchallenged until the late 1960s and early ’70s, when 
researchers noted that early work erroneously assumed that ref-
erence group orientation—the societal group of which people un-
derstand themselves to be a part—was necessarily related to, if 
not synonymous with, self-concept. Since then, multiple studies 
have challenged flawed understandings of racial identity, con-
firming that African Americans, despite enduring bias and dis-
crimination, do not, in fact, suffer from poor self-esteem.55  
Despite these studies, cultural-deficit models persist, mak-
ing it difficult for people to recognize, much less understand, how 
minoritized racial identity is a source of pride and resiliency for 
group members.56 The cultural-deficit model becomes the base-
line from which cultural phenomena in the black community is 
assessed and understood.57 Take for example, Dr. John Ogbu’s 
“acting-white” theory, which suggests that the racial achieve-
ment gap is due, in part, to a disassociation among black youths 
with academic achievement. According to the theory, black stu-
dents have concluded that academic success is a white, rather 
than black, cultural practice, and have thus developed an oppo-
 
 54. Vinay Harpalani et al., Doll Studies, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF RACE AND RAC-
ISM 67, 69 (2013) (explaining that in early childhood, children are cognitively 
egocentric, lacking awareness of how others view them and primarily modeling 
the values and behaviors they observe; accordingly, although children were 
aware of the connotations associated with skin color, they had neither low self-
esteem nor feelings of inferiority); Stephanie J. Rowley et al., The Relationship 
Between Racial Identity and Self-Esteem in African American College and High 
School Students, 74 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 715, 719 (1998). 
 55. Rowley et al., supra note 54, at 716. 
 56. Some of the reaction to the controversy regarding Rachel Dolezal’s false 
claims to black racial identity was grounded in disbelief that a woman, given 
the option, would voluntarily choose to adopt black identity. See, e.g., Fredrik 
deBoer, Opinion, Why Rachel Dolezal Would Want to Pass as a Black Woman, 
L.A. TIMES (June 13, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-0614 
-deboer-rachel-dolezal-20150614-story.html. 
 57. The impact of preexisting theoretical frameworks for race shape even 
the research questions asked and methodologies used. See Paul Gowder, Criti-
cal Race Science and Critical Race Philosophy of Science, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 
3155, 3157 (2015) (arguing that the observation of race is never a neutral one, 
and calling for “empirically informed critical race theory and critical race theory 
informed philosophy of science” to mitigate the problem). 
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sitional sense of collective identity that rejects academic achieve-
ment associated with Whites.58  
Sociologist Dr. Margaret Beale Spencer has challenged the 
theory, examining Ogbu’s claim and concluding that it lacks em-
pirical verification, is informed by a cultural-deficit model, and 
ignores the long history of African American valuing of, and in-
vestment in, education.59 Others have come to similar conclu-
sions, finding that African Americans possess a strong belief in, 
and desire for, learning, exhibited through an ongoing collective 
struggle for educational opportunity and equality.60 Moreover, 
African American teachers have long emphasized racial pride 
and commitment to academic excellence in black youth, believ-
ing that Blacks must prove themselves qualified by producing 
not just equal, but superior, work.61 Other research on the “act-
ing white” phenomenon finds that it only occurs in majority-
white schools where group racial solidarity is most important.62 
As such, the phenomenon is not about black rejection of aca-
demic success at all, but rather about black students patrolling 
the lines of solidarity in spaces where that solidarity is under-
stood as necessary for survival.63  
Impoverished notions of black racial identity nevertheless 
continue to inform not only legal holdings but the actual framing 
of black claims for justice before the Court. Contrasting narra-
tives of “white innocence” and “black guilt,” for example, litter 
 
 58. Signithia Fordham & John U. Ogbu, Black Students’ School Success: 
Coping with the “Burden of ‘Acting White’”, 18 URB. REV. 176, 181 (1986). 
 59. Margaret Beale Spencer & Vinay Harpalani, What Does “Acting White” 
Actually Mean? Racial Identity, Adolescent Development, and Academic 
Achievement Among African American Youth, in MINORITY STATUS, OPPOSI-
TIONAL CULTURE, AND SCHOOLING 222, 223 (John U. Ogbu ed., 2008). 
 60. Mavis G. Sanders, Overcoming Obstacles: Academic Achievement as a 
Response to Racism and Discrimination, 66 J. NEGRO EDUC. 83, 84 (1997) (sum-
marizing arguments advanced by Weinberg, Anderson, and Perry).  
 61. Id. at 84–85; Gloria Ladson-Billings, Toward a Theory of Culturally 
Relevant Pedagogy, 32 AM. EDUC. RES. J. 465, 468 (1995) (citing to a long “his-
tory of African-American educational struggle and achievement” that contra-
dicts assertions that Blacks do not value education). 
 62. Roland G. Fryer, “Acting White”, 6 EDUC. NEXT 53, 57 (2006);Roland G. 
Fryer, Jr. & Paul Torelli, An Empirical Analysis of ‘Acting White’ 20 (Nat’l Bu-
reau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11334, 2005), http://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w11334.pdf. 
 63. Fryer, supra note 62, at 58–59 (rejecting the theory of oppositional cul-
ture, and adopting instead the theory that students will necessarily experience 
a “trade-off” between academic success and rejection by peers when that stu-
dent comes from a “traditionally low-achieving group,” fearful of losing one of 
their own); Fryer, Jr. & Torelli, supra note 62 (describing a trade-off between 
popularity and achievement).  
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the Court’s affirmative action jurisprudence. Whites challenging 
affirmative action consistently characterize the measures as un-
fair. The Court subscribes to this narrative, characterizing white 
plaintiffs in affirmative action cases as “innocent” victims of 
race-conscious policies implemented in response to problems not 
of their own making. In Regents of the University of California v. 
Bakke, the Court highlighted the unfairness of asking “innocent 
persons . . . to endure . . . [deprivation as] the price of member-
ship in the dominant majority,”64 going on to note that the Court 
had “never approved a classification that aids persons perceived 
as members of relatively victimized groups at the expense of 
other innocent individuals in the absence of judicial, legislative, 
or administrative findings of constitutional or statutory viola-
tions.”65 Casting Whites as innocent fails to acknowledge the 
group as undeserving beneficiaries of white privilege. 
This narrative of white innocence and victimhood neces-
sarily derives its power from the implicit contrast with a guilty 
person of color who unfairly benefits from affirmative action.66 
This comparison is only strengthened by enduring stereotypes 
about black people as lazy, undeserving, and marginalized on ac-
count of their own bad decision-making.67 These beliefs in black 
failure, laziness, and flawed choices inform welfare retrench-
ment,68 education policy that ignores structural issues in favor 
of standardization and high-stakes testing meant to create “ac-
countability,”69 and even policing strategies that profile people 
 
 64. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 294 n.34 (1978) 
(emphasis added). 
 65. Id. at 307 (emphasis added). 
 66. See Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 
297, 315 (1990) (“The assertion of the innocent white victim draws power from 
the implicit contrast with the ‘defiled taker.’ The defiled taker is the black per-
son who undeservedly reaps the advantages of affirmative action.”). 
 67. The problematic consequences of beliefs in the bad decision-making of 
people of color are only aggravated in an era of increased commitment to 
“choice” in the United States. In the public education context, the commitment 
to school choice allows politicians and policymakers to abdicate responsibility 
for quality public education, forcing parents to make choices for which they are 
to blame if made in error. This has particularly grave consequences for parents 
of color, whose “choices” and agency in the school system are significantly con-
strained relative to Whites. See Osamudia R. James, Opt-Out Education: School 
Choice as Racial Subordination, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1083, 1083–87 (2014). 
 68. See JOE SOSS, RICHARD C. FORDING & SANFORD F. SCHRAM, DISCIPLIN-
ING THE POOR: NEOLIBERAL PATERNALISM AND THE PERSISTENT POWER OF 
RACE 95–101 (2011). 
 69. James, supra note 67, at 1111 (arguing that No Child Left Behind, with 
its focus on standardization and high-stakes testing, focuses on the failures of 
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of color, despite evidence consistently confirming that the profil-
ing is unjustified.70 Although the language of affirmative action 
opinions is not definitive as to state and federal policy, the Court 
does affirm and perpetuate notions of black guilt and irresponsi-
bility in ways that shape broader social policy and public percep-
tion. 
2. Entrenched White Affirmation 
Just as Blacks are presented as guilty in affirmative action 
jurisprudence, white plaintiffs are repeatedly presented as hard-
working, industrious, and committed to justice. Again trading on 
the notion of black guilt, the Court in Grutter noted that there 
are “serious problems of justice connected with the idea of pref-
erence itself,”71 and that “[e]ven remedial race-based govern-
ment action generally ‘remains subject to continuing oversight 
to assure that it will work the least harm possible to other inno-
cent persons competing for the benefit.’”72 Notably absent from 
the Court’s opinion in Grutter was engagement with corrective 
or distributive justice claims raised in amicus briefs that would 
implicitly acknowledge white responsibility for, or at least com-
plicity in, racial subordination, and also undercut notions of 
white innocence.73  
Instead, white plaintiffs in cases challenging affirmative ac-
tion are often favorably presented by the Court, and their inno-
cence affirmed in the language of the opinions and final rulings. 
In striking down race-conscious school assignment policies in 
Parents Involved, the Court affirmed the innocent Crystal Mer-
edith who was simply defending her child’s educational rights 
against the school district,74 and who was “shocked” that people 
 
students while ignoring structural conditions that drive the achievement gap, 
including poverty, resource inequity, and racial and economic isolation). 
 70. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (striking 
down New York City’s stop and frisk program as unconstitutional and not jus-
tified by successful crime prevention). 
 71. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003) (quoting Regents of the 
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298). 
 72. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Bakke, 438 U.S. at 308). 
 73. Brown-Nagin, supra note 36, at 1485–86 (noting that the Grutter ma-
jority, and even Justices supportive of race-conscious policies, responded to the 
credentials bias claim of intervenors with silence). 
 74. Bill Mears, Divided Court Rejects School Diversity Plans, CNN (June 
28, 2007), http://www.cnn.com/2007/LAW/06/28/scotus.race (quoting Meredith 
accusing the school board of wanting her to “sacrifice [her son’s] learning in or-
der to maintain the status quo,” and asserting that the school board felt “[her] 
son’s education was not as important as [the school district’s] plan.”). 
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could understand race to be an issue in the desegregation case.75 
The Court similarly affirmed the innocent Kathleen Brose who 
insisted that Seattle’s integration plan was “terribly unfair” to 
her white daughter.76 In upholding Brose’s claim, the Court 
failed to acknowledge that, like other Whites in Seattle, Brose 
had enjoyed a monopoly on access to the city’s best schools for 
years, and was thus complicit in the denied access of the city’s 
students of color.77 
Affirmative action, moreover, is an increasingly favored tar-
get for claims of reverse discrimination against individual 
Whites. Scholars like Ira Katznelson have challenged our under-
standing of affirmative action, broadening both our historical at-
tention span and understanding of the constituent laws and pol-
icies. Before programs were initiated in the 1960s to broaden 
access for minorities to elite education and jobs, affirmative ac-
tion began in the 1930s and ’40s, through welfare, work, and war 
policies that benefited Whites.78 The web of economic and social 
policy, for example, that the New Deal ushered in to secure pros-
perity for Americans systematically excluded African Americans 
while privileging white Americans through three key features: 
(1) the use of “racially laden” legislative language that excluded 
black laborers;79 (2) the placing of enforcement power in racist 
local officials throughout the South;80 and (3) the absence of any 
anti-discrimination provisions in the New Deal framework.81 
These features were further mirrored in welfare and war 
policies of the same period. Unchecked discrimination, combined 
with already existing structural inequalities,82 ensured racial 
 
 75. Janelle MacDonald, Local Mom Makes National Headlines with Law-
suit Against JCPS, WAVE3 NEWS (Oct. 10, 2006), http://www.wave3.com/story/ 
5522206/local-mom-makes-national-headlines-with-lawsuit-against-jcps. 
 76. Transcript, An Imperfect Revolution Voices from the Desegregation Era, 
AM. RADIOWORKS (last visited Oct. 12, 2017), http://americanradioworks 
.publicradio.org/features/deseg/transcript.html. 
 77. The Seattle school district was segregated by white and non-white peo-
ples, with Whites enjoying near-exclusive access to the city’s better schools on 
the North side. Goodwin Liu, Seattle and Louisville, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 287–
88 (2007). 
 78. IRA KATZNELSON, WHEN AFFIRMATIVE ACTION WAS WHITE: AN UN-
TOLD HISTORY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 18–23 
(2005).  
 79. Id. at 22.  
 80. Id. at 22–23.  
 81. Id.  
 82. Relief payments, for example, were calibrated so as not to undercut the 
labor market. As a result, Blacks who experienced lower earning power had 
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differentials in government support for poor Blacks and Whites, 
with Blacks receiving fewer benefits relative to their needs than 
Whites.83 Moreover, even after Blacks were permitted to serve 
in the military, racialized policies ensured that opportunities 
provided by the military to veterans for education and training, 
occupational advancement in a post-industrial world, and the 
amassing of social and cultural capital, were denied to Blacks 
while enjoyed primarily and most fully by Whites.84 The G.I. Bill, 
described as a “model welfare system” providing the “most wide-
ranging set of social benefits ever” in the form of home purchas-
ing and college education, created middle-class America near-ex-
clusively for Whites, while leaving black veterans readjusting to 
civilian life to navigate their return from war alone.85  
The politics, however, underlining obstacles to black equal-
ity and support for white privilege (without ever stigmatizing 
Whites) are rarely thought of as identity politics, even though 
they are clearly designed to benefit white people. President 
Nixon’s appeals to the silent majority, as part of his “southern 
strategy,”86 for example, invoked policy positions that main-
tained and affirmed white interests at the expense of black 
ones,87 including the concentration of state power in opposition 
to national policies meant to protect the minority from the ma-
jority, opposition to bussing in service of desegregation, and 
colorblind liberalism that equated benign and invidious discrim-
ination.88  
 
their benefits limited to reflect what they would actually earn if they had a job. 
Id. at 38.  
 83. Id. at 36–39.  
 84. Id. at 106–12.  
 85. Id. at 113–41; see also Juan F. Perea, Doctrines of Delusion: How the 
History of the G.I. Bill and Other Inconvenient Truths Undermine the Supreme 
Court’s Affirmative Action Jurisprudence, 75 U. PITT. L. REV. 583, 588–604 
(2014). 
 86. The “southern strategy” is the term used to describe President Nixon’s 
courtship of conservative southern Whites through “retrogressive” public rhet-
oric and the denunciation of bussing in service of integration. DEAN J. 
KOTLOWSKI, NIXON’S CIVIL RIGHTS: POLITICS, PRINCIPLE, AND POLICY 1–2 
(2001). But see MATTHEW D. LASSITER, THE SILENT MAJORITY: SUBURBAN POL-
ITICS IN THE SUNBELT SOUTH (2006) (arguing that overreliance on race-reduc-
tionist narratives like “Southern Strategy” and “white backlash” to explain po-
litical transformations downplays the centrality of class ideology in the outlook 
of suburban voters, and also ignores class divisions among white southerners 
throughout the era). 
 87. LASSITER, supra note 86, at 5. 
 88. Id. (“[T]here is no reason to feel guilty about wanting to enjoy what you 
get and . . . about wanting your children in good schools close to home, or about 
wanting to be judged fairly on your ability . . . . [Liberals] believe that the only 
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Nor are these movements historical artifacts. Affirmative 
action is steadily being dismantled, despite operating under the 
court-approved mantle of diversity. The Court, for example, 
granted certiorari for the second time in a case challenging the 
University of Texas’s race-conscious admissions program, de-
spite the program having passed a heightened review by the 
Fifth Circuit that the Court itself mandated.89 In spring of 2014, 
the Court affirmed the right of white voters to prohibit, through 
state constitutional amendment, race-conscious policies in edu-
cation and labor.90 In Shelby County v. Holder, the Court gutted 
the Voting Rights Act, eliminating preclearance requirements 
that helped prevent changes in voting laws or practices that 
could disenfranchise voters by race, particularly in southern 
states where voter disenfranchisement of non-white voters is at 
its worst.91 The changes to the University of Texas’s admission 
program and to the Voting Rights Act were primarily advocated 
for by Whites who believe that race-conscious government poli-
cies work to their disadvantage, in violation of equal protection 
and due process.92 Given this trend, group recognition for Whites 
exists under the purportedly race-neutral cloak of colorblindness 
and equality. Moreover, to the extent that they are rhetorically 
stylized as colorblind, white-interest-group politics become 
deeply embedded in American law and policy in ways less recog-
nizable but more potent than black identity politics. Our current 
equality jurisprudence both undermines anti-racist interpreta-
tions of the law and devalues minoritized identity, while affirm-
ing white racial identity under the guise of colorblindness. 
 
way to achieve . . . social justice is to place power in the hands of a strong central 
government which will do what they think has to be done, no matter what the 
majority thinks . . . . [The United States represents] the land of opportunity, not 
the land of quotas and restrictions.”). 
 89. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014) (affirming 
district court decision that the University’s use of race in its admissions policy 
satisfied strict scrutiny). In 2016, the Supreme Court issued a final opinion in 
Fisher, affirming the diversity rationale and the university’s use of it in their 
admissions policies. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016). 
 90. Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014) 
(declining to set aside amendment to the Michigan constitution that prohibited 
affirmative action in public education, employment, and contracting). 
 91. See Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013). 
 92. For example, Edward Blum, a key player in bringing the Fisher case to 
the Supreme Court, is motivated by a desire to create a “color-blind” society and 
insists he’s fighting for civil rights. Stephanie Mencimer, Meet the Brains Be-
hind the Effort To Get the Supreme Court To Rethink Civil Rights, MOTHER 
JONES (Mar./Apr. 2016), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/04/Edward 
-blum-supreme-court-affirmative-action-civil-rights. 
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II.  VALUING BLACK IDENTITY   
“I am Black. Black is specific. Black centers me.” 93 
 
“And I have the resilience of a race who has survived every 
previous effort to exterminate it (and to compel it to exterminate 
itself).” 94 
 
“Sometimes it’s important to remind ourselves that blackness 
isn’t just a parade of calamities and disadvantage.” 95 
 
The law and policy canvassed above reflects the incapacity 
of legal actors to perceive minoritized racial identity as a positive 
good, with a useful function in society. Whiteness has come to 
represent a positive property right in the American political, so-
cial, and economic landscape, providing its owners with benefits 
such as higher wages, racially exclusive access to public facili-
ties, and the affirmation of self.96 At the same time, “blackness” 
has come to represent only a negative social experience.97 And 
this negative conception of blackness is what informs the Court’s 
engagement with racial identity. Unable to engage identity un-
tethered to the scourge of racism and discrimination, the Court 
is content to simply dispense with identity all together. 
Such a perception of identity fails to recognize the curative 
and protective benefit that minoritized identity in general, and 
 
 93. Fanta, WOC vs. Black Women, BLOGSPOT ARCHIVER (May 20, 2015), 
http://fansylla.blogspot.com/2015/05/woc-vs-black-women.html. 
 94. Stacia L. Brown, When Parenting Feels like a Fool’s Errand: On the 
Death of Michael Brown, STACIAL.BROWN.COM (Aug. 10, 2014), http:// 
stacialbrown.com/2014/08/10/when-parenting-feels-like-a-fools-errand-on-the 
-death-of-michael-brown. 
 95. Gene Demby, Who Gets To Be Black? Honor the Struggle, But Don’t For-
get the Jokes, NPR: CODESWITCH (June 17, 2015), http://www.npr.org/sections/ 
codeswitch/2015/06/17/414972407/if-you-dont-get-to-be-black-without-the 
-struggle-lets-not-forget-the-jokes. 
 96. Harris, supra note 23, at 1724–28 (explaining how whiteness might be 
characterized as a property interest, providing benefits to all those who can lay 
claim to white racial identity, and excluding non-Whites from the same). 
 97. Mitchell F. Crusto, Blackness as Property: Sex, Race, Status, and 
Wealth, 1 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 51, 64–66 (2005) (“[B]lackness is a negative prop-
erty right in America’s legacy . . . beginning with a history of blacks as whites’ 
enslaved property, continuing to second-class citizenship status following the 
Civil War, and still persisting in a wealth and education gap compared to white 
Americans.”). 
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black racial identity in particular, can confer on individuals.98 
Moreover, minoritized identity is valuable for broader social, po-
litical, and legal reasons. Using black racial identity as a case 
study provides the opportunity to rethink the utility of identity 
in legal, political, and policy contexts, revealing the value of 
 
 98. In exploring the idea of “black resilience,” I do not endorse the myth of 
the “magical Negro,” a perception of Blacks as less vulnerable to pain, more 
generous with forgiveness, endowed with superhuman physical capabilities and 
endurance, wiser and more resilient for navigating oppression, and generous 
with the use of these gifts in service of white people. Indeed, these myths about 
black people inform any number of macro- and micro-racial aggressions, includ-
ing poor pain management in hospitals and increased vulnerability to police 
violence even among young children. See Matteo Forgiarini et al., Racism and 
the Empathy for Pain on Our Skin, 2 FRONTIERS PSYCHOL., May 2011, at 1 
(finding that white observers reacted to pain suffered by black participants sig-
nificantly less than to the pain of other Whites); Sophie Trawalter et al., Racial 
Bias in Perceptions of Others’ Pain, 7 PLOS ONE, Nov. 2012, at 1 (finding evi-
dence that people assume Blacks feel less pain than Whites, a conclusion rooted 
in perceptions of status and the privilege or hardship that status confers); Jon-
athan Capehart, It’s Tamir Rice’s Fault, WASH. POST: POSTPARTISAN (Mar. 2, 
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-partisan/wp/2015/03/02/its 
-tamir-rices-fault (detailing how, after shooting and killing 12-year-old Tamir 
Rice for playing with a toy gun, police officers described him as a “black male, 
maybe 20,” while the president of the Cleveland Police Patrolman’s Association 
described Rice as “menacing,” “[not] that little kid you’re seeing in pictures,” 
and “a 12-year-old in an adult body”).  
Moreover, the impact of race and racial discrimination regarding Blacks in 
the United States may also be implicated in higher rates of mental illness, a 
phenomenon to which reports regarding increasing suicide rates among black 
children might attest. Sabrina Tavernise, Rise in Suicide by Black Children 
Surprises Researchers, N.Y. TIMES, (May 18, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/05/19/health/suicide-rate-for-black-children-surged-in-2-decades-study 
-says.html (articulating, as one possibility for increasing suicide rates, the pos-
sibility that “black children are more likely to be exposed to violence and trau-
matic stress”). Nevertheless, positive racial identity for Blacks can enhance psy-
chological resilience in ways that should not be discounted when considering 
how and whether identity should be centered in anti-discrimination jurispru-
dence. For more on the “magical Negro” trope, see D. MARVIN JONES, RACE, SEX, 
AND SUSPICION 35–36 (2005) (detailing several characters, including John 
Coffey in The Green Mile and Bagger Vance in The Legend of Bagger Vance, as 
examples of the “magic negro”); THE GREEN MILE (Castle Rock Entertainment 
1999); THE LEGEND OF BAGGER VANCE (Twentieth Century Fox 2000). On the 
perceived enhanced capacity of Blacks for forgiveness, see Julia Craven, It’s Not 
Black Folks’ Burden To Forgive Racist Killers, HUFFINGTON POST (July 1, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/07/01/forgiveness-charleston-shooting_n_ 
7690772.html; Kiese Laymon, Black Churches Taught Us To Forgive White Peo-
ple. We Learned To Shame Ourselves, GUARDIAN (June 23, 2015), http://www 
.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jun/23/black-churchesforgive-white 
-people-shame; Stacey Patton, Black America Should Stop Forgiving White Rac-
ists, WASH. POST: POSTEVERYTHING (June 22, 2015), http://www 
.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/06/22/black-america-should 
-stop-forgiving-white-racists. 
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identity in the struggle to dismantle structural discrimination 
and enhance democracy.  
A. THE CURATIVE BENEFIT OF “WE” 
In the context of liberatory politics, blackness is most useful 
when understood simply as a social construction, racing some in-
dividuals as Black in ways that undermine equality.99 Although 
practical and ideological problems with defining and drawing the 
contours of black identity exist, scholarship has nevertheless rec-
ognized the potential of black racial identity to ensure social be-
longing and security. Scholars have characterized blackness as 
“crucial” to the social identities of African Americans,100 while 
others have noted that race does not only impact one’s identity 
or sense of self, but rather “renders that identity meaningful, 
and, therefore, valuable—especially among the racially op-
pressed.”101  
In contrast to white racial identity, which is typically not 
salient for Whites unless juxtaposed against non-white racial 
groups, racial minorities form identities around shared cultural 
norms, histories of immigration, or racial oppression.102 Latinos, 
for example, might develop racial identities informed by immi-
gration of ancestors to the United States, while Blacks might de-
velop racial identities informed by a shared struggle against ra-
cial subordination within America.103 In this sense, non-white 
racial identity, even when constituted of individuals from radi-
cally different ethnic groups,104 can still be shaped by historical 
 
 99. TOMMIE SHELBY, WE WHO ARE DARK: THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDA-
TIONS OF BLACK SOLIDARITY 23, 209–23 (2005).  
 100. Janine Young Kim, Postracialism: Race After Exclusion, 17 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 1063, 1097 (2013) (citing sociologist Michael Eric Dyson’s re-
marks about the possibility of a post-racist future after the election of Barack 
Obama as President of the United States). 
 101. Id.; see also JOHN A. POWELL, RACING TO JUSTICE: TRANSFORMING OUR 
CONCEPTIONS OF SELF AND OTHER TO BUILD AN INCLUSIVE SOCIETY 66–67 
(2012) (arguing that “[b]y addressing how race functions to dominate,” we can 
potentially “transform racial meanings without necessarily destroying racial 
identity”). 
 102. Adrienne D. Davis, Identity Notes Part One: Playing in the Light, 45 
AM. U. L. REV. 695, 701–02 (1996). 
 103. Id. 
 104. MANNING MARABLE, BEYOND BLACK AND WHITE: TRANSFORMING AFRI-
CAN-AMERICAN POLITICS 186 (2009) (explaining that although native-born Af-
rican Americans, Trinidadians, Haitians, Nigerians, and Afro-Brazilians have 
“remarkably little” language, culture, ethnic traditions, rituals, or religious af-
filiations in common, they are all racially “black” in the United States, united 
by their identification as “black” on the streets and subject to the same “pitfalls 
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experiences of group subjugation and the struggle to forge a 
more positive racial and American identity against presump-
tions of inferiority.  
The claim to identity of non-white groups, then, cannot be 
disentangled from the experience of group resistance to inequal-
ity and oppression. As explained by Manning Marable, non-
white racial identity in the United States is 
not an ethnic identification or culture, but an awareness of shared ex-
perience, suffering and struggles against the barriers of racial division. 
These collective experiences, survival tales and grievances form the ba-
sis of a historical consciousness—a group’s recognition of what it has 
witnessed and what it can anticipate in the near future.105 
Black Americans, for example, not only constitute a distinct cul-
tural group, but have also experienced a history of systemic op-
pression as a racial minority.106 “[T]heir individual identities as 
Blacks and as Americans are affected both by Black culture and 
by American racism.”107 Even among scholars who reject the 
idea of a shared black identity,108 there is recognition that the 
familiar sense of “we-ness,” cultivated by that shared experience, 
enables Blacks to empathize and provide mutual support for one 
another, motivates Blacks to agitate for racial and social justice, 
and enables Blacks to cultivate pride and dignity in the face of 
marginalization.109 
 
and prejudices built into the . . . established social order for those defined as 
‘black’”). 
 105. Id. at 187. 
 106. Maurianne Adams, Core Processes of Racial Identity Development, in 
NEW PERSPECTIVES ON RACIAL IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT: A THEORETICAL AND 
PRACTICAL DEVELOPMENT 209, 212 (Charmaine L. Wijeyesinghe & Bailey W. 
Jackson III eds., 2001) (quoting Rita Hardiman & Bailey W. Jackson, Racial 
Identity Development: Understanding Racial Dynamics in College Classrooms 
and on Campus, in 49 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR TEACHING AND LEARNING 21, 22 
(Maurianne Adams ed., 1992)). 
 107. Id. 
 108. Tommie Shelby argues that the basis of black political unity should not 
be a shared black identity. A shared black identity, or “thick” conception of 
blackness, views the mark of blackness as more than a vague social marker 
imposed by those outside the group, but rather as signifying something 
“deeper”—an identity with which individuals can engage with some measure of 
agency, adopting or losing the marker through individual action. This thicker 
conception of blackness operates through five modes based on notions of biology, 
ethnicity, nationality, culture, and kinship. Shelby argues, however, that this 
“thick” black identity is “not needed for political solidarity” and may be counter-
productive to the emancipatory goals of the group. SHELBY, supra note 99, at 
23, 209–11, 216–23. 
 109. Id. at 245. 
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It is accordingly of no surprise that theoretical and empirical 
work in psychology, sociology, and social psychology have con-
sistently demonstrated links between racial identity and posi-
tive psychosocial adaptation.110 Literature reviews on African-
American identity and self-concept, for example, have found at 
least thirty-six percent of the literature reporting a significant 
positive association.111 Similarly, researchers have found that a 
primary function of internalized racialized identity for African 
Americans is to buffer them against the potential deleterious im-
pact of racism on their psychological well-being.112 Accordingly, 
individuals for whom race is more central are more likely to re-
port lower levels of psychological distress.113 These findings are 
consistent with studies that use racial identity attitude scales to 
conclude that race centrality is associated with better mental 
health, and that strongly identifying with a minoritized racial 
identity is beneficial to young African American adults.114  
Similarly, “students who strongly identify with their racial 
group are better able to negotiate [racially-]negative environ-
ments, deal with discrimination and prejudice, and have high 
self-esteems.”115 Knowing this, African American parents often 
transmit meaning of racial status through an emphasis on ethnic 
and racial pride, self-development, awareness of racial barriers, 
 
 110. Ebony McGee & Margaret Beale Spencer, Theoretical Analysis of Resil-
ience and Identity: An African American Engineer ’s Life Story, in THINKING 
COMPREHENSIVELY ABOUT EDUCATION: SPACES OF EDUCATIVE POSSIBILITY 
AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 161, 163–64 (2012). 
 111. Rowley et al., supra note 54, at 716 (citing WILLIAM E. CROSS, SHADES 
OF BLACK: DIVERSITY IN AFRICAN-AMERICAN IDENTITY 189–217 (1991)) (review-
ing forty-five studies published between 1939 and 1987). Part of the problem in 
identifying more studies that show a significant positive association is re-
searcher difficulty in explicating “the mechanism by which a strong racial iden-
tity should result in higher levels of self-esteem.” Id. 
 112. Robert M. Sellers et al., Racial Identity, Racial Discrimination, Per-
ceived Stress, and Psychological Distress Among African American Young 
Adults, 43 J. HEALTH & SOC. BEHAV. 302, 304 (2003) (citing WILLIAM E. CROSS 
ET AL., AFRICAN AMERICAN IDENTITY DEVELOPMENT: THEORY, RESEARCH, AND 
INTERVENTION 3–64 (Reginald L. Jones ed., 1998)). 
 113. Id. at 311. 
 114. Interestingly, race centrality may also serve as a risk factor for perceiv-
ing more discrimination, possibly because people with high levels of race cen-
trality are more sensitive to the presence of discrimination in ambiguous situa-
tions, because Whites are more sensitive to their high race centrality, or because 
their high race centrality makes race more salient for Whites, thus triggering 
more out-group bias behavior. Id. at 311–12.  
 115. McGee & Spencer, supra note 110, at 164. 
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and the value of egalitarianism.116 For the children parented by 
these adults, both personal efficacy and academic performance 
are enhanced by proactive orientation toward racial barriers;117 
moreover, “African-American students with a high-awareness of 
racial discrimination respond to discrimination in ways that are 
conducive rather than detrimental to academic success.”118 Stud-
ies examining this phenomenon, for example, find that high-
awareness students are more likely to be both high-achieving 
students and the students with a strong racial identity.119 In the 
face of discrimination, these students do not consciously or sub-
consciously withdraw, but instead exert more academic effort.120 
Research specifically studying college students similarly ex-
plores the impact of racial socialization—“explicit and implicit 
messages that provide African American youth with healthy 
methods for coping with the realities of racism and racial hostil-
ity.”121 These messages cover common themes, including the de-
velopment of cultural pride and the promotion of cultural 
knowledge, including history, traditions, and the current state of 
racial oppression that African Americans face.122 Moreover, 
these messages are positive, promoting healthy identity for-
mation, “as well as an awareness of and constructive responses 
to racism without promoting hatred or discrimination toward 
members of other racial or ethnic groups.”123 Examining these 
messages, researchers have found that racial socialization mes-
sages, as well as socialization messages specifically emphasizing 
the appreciation of cultural legacy, moderated the link between 
perceived discrimination and resilience among African Ameri-
can college students.124 Students who received fewer racial so-
cialization messages demonstrated lower resilience in response 
to higher levels of perceived racial discrimination.125 Conversely, 
 
 116. Phillip J. Bowman & Cleopatra Howard, Race-Related Socialization, 
Motivation, and Academic Achievement: A Study of Black Youths in Three-Gen-
eration Families, 24 J. AM. ACAD. CHILD PSYCHIATRY 134, 137–40 (1985). 
 117. Id. at 134. 
 118. Sanders, supra note 60, at 83. 
 119. Id. at 90. 
 120. Id.  
 121. Danice L. Brown & Tracy L. Tylka, Racial Discrimination and Resili-
ence in African American Young Adults: Examining Racial Socialization as a 
Moderator, 37 J. BLACK PSYCHOL. 259, 262 (2011). 
 122. Id. 
 123. Sanders, supra note 60, at 91. 
 124. Brown & Tylka, supra note 121, at 274–75. 
 125. Id. at 275. 
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for those students who received more racial socialization mes-
sages, higher levels of perceived racial discrimination were no 
longer negatively associated with resilience; and those receiving 
the most messages had significantly higher resilience scores.126  
Blackness has functioned as an affirmation of self, but with-
out the accompanying sense of racial superiority. Instead, in the 
face of white supremacy and American racism, Blacks have re-
jected the stigma that might attach to black identity, transform-
ing it into a source of pride and social resilience.127 Moreover, 
that transformation has functioned within the black community 
even when it would be denied externally by Whites in power.  
B. BLACKNESS IN DEMOCRACY 
Black racial identity also has value not just within the black 
community, but also in broader American society. The recogni-
tion of black racial identity, in both social and legal spaces, de-
fines individuals and their relationships to others in ways that 
are integral to a healthy democracy.  
1. Democratic Recognition 
Legal frameworks play both a regulatory and expressivist 
function in our democracy, and that expression can change over 
time. Identity, historically recognized in our equal protection 
structure as central to equality claims, has conveyed particular 
messages about racial group status.128 Legal standing in Brown 
v. Board of Education, for example, turned African Americans 
into full-fledged members of the human race entitled to equal 
protection under the law.129 Standing in Brown was also about 
the equal standing and participation of African Americans in our 
broader democracy. When Brown’s plaintiffs and judges lever-
aged our identitarian equal protection framework in this way, it 
served as an authoritative declaration that Blacks—with a par-
ticular experience in the country—deserved to be heard and that 
their particular experience was to be recognized and vali-
dated.130 When legal frameworks change, the altered structures 
tell new stories, allowing for different expressions that impact 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. at 263. 
 128. KARST, supra note 16, at 90. 
 129. Id. at 187. 
 130. Id. at 107. See also K. Anthony Appiah, Identity, Authenticity, Survival: 
Multicultural Societies and Social Reproduction, in MULTICULTURALISM: EXAM-
INING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 149, 161–63 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994). 
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and frame identity development and equality claims under the 
law. Moving away from identity, then, is a new story that 
prompts both misrecognition and non-recognition for Blacks.  
Demands for recognition are informed by the link between 
recognition and identity. Identity, or who we understand our-
selves to be, is partly shaped by recognition or its absence, the 
latter most often in the form of misrecognition.131 If individuals 
or groups are exposed to confining, demeaning, or contemptible 
reflections of themselves, they suffer psychological damage and 
distortion.132  
Misrecognition can also take the form of erasure—a failure 
to be acknowledged altogether. Attempts, for example, to 
broaden literary canons in university humanities departments, 
or adopt multicultural curricula at elementary and secondary 
schools, are in response not just to what students are missing 
when their academic studies are limited to “dead white males,” 
but also to what students who cannot see themselves in the ma-
terials experience.133 By being made invisible, students from the 
excluded groups are subject to the presumption that members of 
their group do not produce culture or knowledge worthy of focus, 
attention, or even consideration. This form of misrecognition can 
demean worth and constrain full development.134 Recognition 
scholarship, then, underscores the importance of “mutually af-
firming [social relationships] that allow[] citizens to operate as 
equals within the confines of the social contract”;135 although cit-
izens require a fair distribution of resources in order to flourish, 
they also need “recognition of their humanity and unique-
ness.”136 
As such, the state must offer equal opportunities for recog-
nition, ensuring that groups do not systematically suffer from 
misrecognition in the forms of stereotype, stigma, or erasure.137 
Although African Americans surely want to be recognized as 
more than their racial identity,138 they also want recognition for 
 
 131. Charles Taylor, The Politics of Recognition, in MULTICULTURALISM: EX-
AMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 25, 25–26 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1994). 
 132. Id. 
 133. Id. at 65–66. 
 134. Id. 
 135. MELISSA HARRIS-PERRY, SISTER CITIZEN: SHAME, STEREOTYPES, AND 
BLACK WOMEN IN AMERICA 35–36 (2011).  
 136. Id. at 36. 
 137. Id. at 37.  
 138. Id. at 37–39 (explaining that recognition scholarship emphasizes con-
nection between individuals and groups, with those from marginalized groups). 
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their group history, culture, and struggle in the United States.139 
Although recognition scholarship and identity politics are cri-
tiqued as being concerned with symbols and cultural battles, ra-
ther than substance, economic battles, and the actual exercise of 
power,140 there is nevertheless a relationship between recogni-
tion and redistribution; “recognition is not just about actualiza-
tion or individual interactions,” but about “institutionalized pat-
terns of cultural value in ways that prevent one from 
participating as a peer in social life.”141 Ultimately, you cannot 
effectively and equally redistribute patterns of cultural value if 
you cannot accurately recognize citizens from low-status and 
stigmatized identities.142 
2. Democratic Participation and Evaluation 
In addition to its importance in democratic recognition, 
black racial identity also enhances democratic practice and in-
clusion. Black group identity and accompanying political solidar-
ity has informed black emancipatory politics and progress in the 
United States, from abolition of slavery to the civil rights move-
ment that dismantled Jim Crow.143 Until the 1960s, race was the 
“decisive factor” in determining opportunities for virtually all Af-
rican Americans, regardless of social and economic status.144 Ac-
cordingly, it is not surprising that African Americans have had 
a tendency to use assessments of what was good for the status of 
the racial group as a proxy for what was good for themselves as 
individuals,145 a phenomenon to which Michael Dawson refers 
as the “black utility heuristic.”146  
Even as economic heterogeneity and mobility in the black 
community increase, perceptions of group interest still inform 
African American political behavior. The fate of group status 
 
 139. Id.  
 140. Id. at 41.  
 141. Id. at 42 (quoting NANCY FRASER & AXEL HONNETH, REDISTRIBUTION 
OR RECOGNITION?: A POLITICAL-PHILOSOPHICAL EXCHANGE 29 (2003)). 
 142. Id.  
 143. MICHAEL C. DAWSON, BEHIND THE MULE: RACE AND CLASS IN AFRICAN-
AMERICAN POLITICS 40–42, 49–51 (1994). 
 144. Id. at 10. 
 145. Id. at 10–11. In addition, information sources in the black community 
like kinship networks, civil rights organizations, and black churches were tight, 
“reinforc[ing] the political salience of racial interests and . . . provid[ing] infor-
mation about racial group status.” Id. at 11. 
 146. This heuristic may also be applicable during various historical periods 
to other groups, including Jews for much of their history, or North Africans in 
France of the 1980s. Id. at 10. 
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“still plays a dominant role in shaping African American parti-
sanship, political choice, and public opinion.”147 Moreover, 
within the parameters of mainstream American politics, individ-
ual economic status plays only a small role in shaping political 
choice.148 Although the communal nature of black politics does 
not prohibit political conflict within communities,149 black polit-
ical solidarity continues to be useful and integral to achieving 
“full freedom and equality that American ideals promise” for 
Blacks.150 
Movements against both police brutality and mass incarcer-
ation serve as compelling examples. In the wake of Trayvon Mar-
tin’s death, audio and video recordings have increasingly made 
visible state-sanctioned abuse of people in poor and minority 
communities at the hands of both private citizens and police.151 
Using the slogan “Black Lives Matter,”152 social justice activists 
and protestors responded to racialized vulnerability that black 
people experience on a daily basis, while also affirming the value 
of black lives.153 The Black Lives Matter project ultimately 
 
 147. Id. at 205. 
 148. Dawson notes, however, that individual economic status does play a 
large role in shaping African American public opinion on several key issues, 
including economic redistribution and “African-American political, social, and 
cultural autonomy from white America.” Id. at 204–05. 
 149. MICHAEL C. DAWSON, BLACK VISIONS: THE ROOTS OF CONTEMPORARY 
AFRICAN-AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEOLOGIES 11 (2001). 
 150. SHELBY, supra note 99, at 1. Shelby also argues, however, that solidar-
ity be informed by multi-racial and trans-institutional commitments. Id. at 136–
41. 
 151. See, e.g., Mercy Benzaquen et al., The Raw Videos That Have Sparked 
Outrage over Police Treatment of Blacks, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/ 
interactive/2017/08/19/us/police-videos-race.html (last updated Aug. 19, 2017) 
(providing an overview of video recordings of incidents of police brutality from 
2013 to 2017). 
 152. Some debate has surrounded the slogan. Historian Andy Seal, for ex-
ample, considered the phrase a retreat, a devolution from a movement for re-
sources framed by “Black Power” to the mere request to exist free of state-sanc-
tioned violence. Andy Seal, From “Black Power” to “Black Lives Matter”, U.S. 
INTELL. HIST. BLOG (Nov. 28, 2014), https://s-usih.org/2014/11/from-black 
-power-to-black-lives-matter. Writer Khalil Gibran Muhammad, however, char-
acterized Black Lives Matter  as a return to first principles—the “necessary as-
sertion of the humanity of black life by the democratic crowd beyond the legal 
fictions of equality.” Khalil Gibran Muhammad, The Revolution Will Be Live-
Tweeted: Why #BlackLivesMatter Is the New Model for Civil Rights, GUARDIAN 
(Dec. 1, 2014), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/dec/01/black 
-lives-matter-civil-rights-movement-ferguson. 
 153. Muhammad, supra note 152. 
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served as both a “love note” to black people154 and a distress sig-
nal about the heightened risk of profiling and police brutality in 
black communities. Although police brutality has long been an 
issue in communities of color,155 an unapologetically identitarian 
movement to address police brutality as disproportionately lev-
eled against black Americans unified and galvanized black peo-
ple across class, education, and geographic lines, forcing recog-
nition at a national scale. Similarly, understanding mass 
incarceration as specifically targeting black men and women has 
helped spark national engagement with race and criminal jus-
tice in America.156 
These movements have been made stronger because of, not 
in spite of, their focus on racial identity. Moreover, race need not 
be only powerful when mobilizing against subordination. Rather, 
race can also work to prompt democratic participation by signal-
ing possibility. Black voter turnout in the historic election of 
Barack Obama, for example, was higher than any other minority 
group that election cycle and also surpassed white voter turnout 
in the younger age groups.157 “Unlike other minority groups 
whose increasing electoral influence has been driven mainly by 
population growth,” the participation of black voters was driven 
by rising turnout, a milestone the Pew Research Center charac-
 
 154. Laura Flanders, Building Movements Without Shedding Differences: 
Alicia Garza of #BlackLivesMatter, TRUTHOUT (Mar. 24, 2015), http://www 
.truth-out.org/news/item/29813-building-movements-without-shedding 
-differences-alicia-garza. 
 155. See Linda Sheryl Greene, Before and After Michael Brown—Toward an 
End to Structural and Actual Violence, 49 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 1 (2015) (trac-
ing the history of police force and violence in black communities, before arguing 
that police use of deadly force against unarmed black men is enabled by legal 
jurisprudence). See generally POLICE BRUTALITY (Jill Nelson ed., 2000) (provid-
ing a general overview of police use of force in communities of color). 
 156. The impact, for example, of Michelle Alexander ’s The New Jim Crow 
was far reaching—inspiring the creation of public groups dedicated to address-
ing mass incarceration, winning several awards, being assigned as required 
reading for incoming freshman at Brown University in 2015, and prompting 
literary scholarly critiques, reviews, and engagement. See MICHELLE ALEXAN-
DER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLIND-
NESS (2010); About First Readings, BROWN UNIV. LIBRARY, http://library.brown 
.edu/create/firstreading2015/about (last visited Oct. 12, 2017); The New Jim 
Crow, NEW PRESS, http://www.thenewpress.com/books/new-jim-crow (last vis-
ited Oct. 12, 2017) (listing awards granted to THE NEW JIM CROW, including the 
Emerson Award, and various scholarly work on the book).  
 157. Sam Roberts, 2008 Surge in Black Voters Nearly Erased Racial Gap, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2009), http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/21/us/politics/ 
21vote.html. 
 158 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:127 
 
terized as “notable” given both a “long history of black disenfran-
chisement” and voter identification laws criticized for dispropor-
tionately depressing minority voter turnout.158 
Rather than signaling the country’s arrival at a post-racial 
moment where racial subordination no longer shaped life out-
comes,159 historic black voter turnout signaled possibility and 
promise—a vision of what more inclusive democracy could look 
like when long-marginalized groups are exposed to the possibil-
ity of equal access. While President Obama’s election in no way 
eliminated racial barriers in the United States, it did illustrate 
how central identity can be in signaling inclusion and belonging 
that results in participation. Through an identitarian legal lens, 
we can evaluate more positively the artificially constructed mi-
nority voting districts that Justice O’Connor refused to approve 
in Shaw v. Reno, absent explicit and egregious black voter dis-
enfranchisement.160 
Black racial identity can also play a diagnostic function in 
American democracy. In their book on emancipatory racial poli-
tics, Lani Guinier and Gerald Torres present race as the miner’s 
canary: the distress of those who are racially marginalized is 
“the first sign of a danger that threatens us all.”161 The difficulty 
that working- and middle-class Blacks have in achieving finan-
cial security, for example, reflect larger problems in the economy 
more generally.162 Black financial mobility is primarily impeded 
by the inability to accumulate wealth, a pattern largely dictated 
by both race-conscious and purportedly race-neutral policies 
throughout America’s history.163 That denial, however, tells us 
 
 158. Paul Taylor, The Growing Electoral Clout of Blacks Is Driven by Turn-
out, Not Demographics, PEW RESEARCH CTR.: SOCIAL & DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS 
(Dec. 26, 2012), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/12/26/the-growing 
-electoral-clout-of-blacks-is-driven-by-turnout-not-demographics. 
 159. Conservative commentator Bill Bennett, for example, noted on the 
evening of Obama’s 2008 victory: “You don’t take any excuses anymore from 
anybody who says, ‘[t]he deck is stacked’ [or] ‘there’s so much in-built this and 
that.’” Election Night ’08 Coverage Continues, CNN (Nov. 4, 2008), http://www 
.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0811/04/ec.03.html. 
 160. See Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 633–57 (1993).  
 161. LANI GUINIER & GERALD TORRES, THE MINER ’S CANARY: ENLISTING 
RACE, RESISTING POWER, TRANSFORMING DEMOCRACY 11 (2002). 
 162. Id. at 44–49. 
 163. For more on how purportedly race-neutral policies marginalized Blacks, 
see KATZNELSON, supra note 78 (discussing the New Deal and GI Bill); DOUG-
LAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN APARTHEID: SEGREGATION AND 
THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993) (discussing housing); Ta-Nehisi 
Coates, The Case for Reparations, ATLANTIC (June 2014), https://www 
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not only about how black economic success has been impeded, 
but also about the failure of an American economy to support 
economic security and stability through any means other than 
intergenerational wealth transfer.164 Although amplified in 
black communities, the same structures, or lack thereof, that 
deny black accumulation of wealth, also operate to the detriment 
of poor and working-class Whites.165  
Similarly, police brutality and mass incarceration as it has 
impacted black people has also brought to light larger systemic 
problems with crime and policing in the United States. An au-
thoritarian and militaristic style of policing and community en-
gagement which has trickled down even into the public school 
system,166 points to larger problems with how police officers are 
trained, incentivized, and rewarded in a purportedly democratic 
society.  
Race also serves as a litmus test for defects in our demo-
cratic system, alerting us to the ways in which non-relevant fac-
tors shape political discourse and, ultimately, policy implemen-
tation. Researchers Joe Soss, Richard C. Fording, and Sanford 
F. Schram, for example, conducted research on poverty govern-
ance between the 1970s and 1995.167 Using models that control 
for factors impacting welfare benefit levels, the researchers 
found that after the 1960s, notions regarding race significantly 
 
.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631 
(providing insight into housing policy).  
 164. GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 161, at 44–45, 49 (noting that although 
only thirty-nine percent of the wealthiest men in America emerged from 
wealthy families in 1900, the percentage moved up to sixty-eight percent in 1950 
and eighty-two percent by 1970, and explaining that “the most potent determi-
nant of economic success [in the U.S.] lies in the accumulated assets that are 
passed on from one generation to the next”). The problem, however, is amplified 
in the black community. DARRICK HAMILTON ET AL., THE NEW SCHOOL, UM-
BRELLAS DON’T MAKE IT RAIN: WHY STUDYING AND WORKING HARD ISN’T 
ENOUGH FOR BLACK AMERICANS 3 (2015) (concluding that for Black families 
and other families of color, “hard work” and academic success are not associated 
with the same levels of wealth as amassed among Whites and that it is “the 
unearned birthright of inheritance or other family transfers that has the great-
est effect on wealth accumulation, and . . . is the largest factor erecting barriers 
to wealth accumulation for people of color”). 
 165. HAMILTON ET AL., supra note 164, at 5 n.14. 
 166. Niraj Chokshi, School Police Across the Country Receive Excess Military 
Weapons and Gear, WASH. POST (Sept. 16, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/blogs/govbeat/wp/2014/09/16/school-police-across-the-country-receive 
-excess-military-weapons-and-gear. 
 167. SOSS ET AL., supra note 68, at 95–101. 
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informed welfare retrenchment.168 Informed by pathological im-
ages of the black underclass that prevailed in political rhetoric, 
and enduring stereotypes about Blacks as lazy and irresponsible, 
benefit reductions in the period were larger in states where 
Blacks made up a higher percentage of the rolls.169 
Other scholars have affirmed the link between race and pub-
lic policy, noting that policies which benefit Blacks, but are not 
explicitly race-targeted, like tax breaks for job creation in poor 
areas or welfare programming, ultimately become racialized,170 
and thus more politically vulnerable.171 These linkages reflect 
democratic defects—ways that legal analysis and accompanying 
political policy, ranging from changes in voting laws172 to how 
citizens engage in political debate,173 undermine the American 
democratic project. Using group racial identity as a diagnostic 
tool allows us to raise awareness about system-wide structures 
of power and inequality, resulting in consciousness that can po-
tentially spark reformation and change.174 
This is not to say that the social construct of race must for-
ever be preserved in order to better track inequality. It is to say, 
rather, that as long as inequalities exist, we would do well to 
understand both how those inequalities are raced, and the po-
tential of racial identity as a political tool to assist in identifying 
and overcoming those injustices.175 
 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. 
 170. David O. Sears & P.J. Henry, The Origins of Symbolic Racism, 85 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 259, 273 (2003). 
 171. Maria Krysan, Prejudice, Politics, and Public Opinion: Understanding 
the Sources of Racial Policy Attitudes, 26 ANN. REV. SOC. 135, 160 (2000) (noting 
that economic policies that become associated in the public’s mind with race will 
face many of the same public opinion obstacles as those that are explicitly ra-
cial). 
 172. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (holding section 4 of the 
Voting Rights Act unconstitutional). 
 173. Osamudia R. James, Diversity, Democracy and White Racial Identity: 
Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 71 NAT’L LAW. GUILD REV. 
1, 5 (2014) (arguing that the diversity rationale has warped public discourse 
regarding racial inequality in the United States, enabling white voters to elim-
inate affirmative action through “democratic” processes). 
 174. GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 161, at 14. 
 175. As explained by Guinier and Torres, although people can help to disrupt 
relationships between race and power without regard to their actual skin color 
or racial category, those who have been raced as “losers” will often be among the 
first to see the effects of normalized inequality. Id. at 17. These same people are 
thus well-positioned to lead movements for social justice that others will want 
to follow if they can frame the movements in response to conditions of injustice 
that warp social institutions more generally. Id. 
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C. IDENTITY, DIGNITY, AND BLACK LIVES 
In addition to the ways in which identity operates to drive 
the formal mechanisms of democracy and policy, identity also 
shapes how individuals are regarded in a democracy; identity is 
fundamental to dignity. The concept of dignity encompasses the 
idea that every human being possesses an intrinsic worth by vir-
tue of being human, and that some ways of treating humans are 
either inconsistent with, or integral to, respect for the intrinsic 
worth of humans.176 Although the idea of dignity can certainly 
be contemplated independently of racial identity, acknowledging 
and respecting the intrinsic worth of human beings requires ac-
knowledging that their humanity has been shaped by their iden-
tity and accompanying experiences. This is especially important 
for minoritized identities, who, unlike Whites, are not permitted 
to understand their humanity through a lens uninformed by ra-
cial identity.177 
One need not look very far into American culture for exam-
ples of how non-recognition of racial identity results in the denial 
of dignity all together. For example, as the Black Lives Matter 
movement gained traction, protestors, cultural commentators, 
and even police officers178 began to respond with “All Lives Mat-
ter.” The “All Lives Matter” retort made invisible disparities in 
police brutality faced by Blacks in particular.179 As noted by Ju-
dith Butler, however, although it is true that “all lives matter,” 
it is “equally true that not all lives are understood to matter,” 
making it important to recognize those lives that are still strug-
gling for genuine recognition.180 Failing to specifically name 
Blacks in their movement against police brutality when Blacks 
 
 176. Christopher McCrudden, Human Dignity and Judicial Interpretation of 
Human Rights, 19 EUR. J. OF INT’L L. 655, 679 (2008). 
 177. Even for those who find identity burdening and seek to shed it, the ef-
fort required to step away from it is a defining experience that merits acknowl-
edgment. See, e.g., CLIFFORD THOMPSON, TWIN OF BLACKNESS: A MEMOIR 1 
(2015) (“I feel toward blackness the way one might toward a twin. I love it, and 
in a pinch I defend it; I resent the baggage that comes with it; I have been made 
to feel afraid of not measuring up to it; I am identified with it whether I want 
to be or not—and never more than when I assert an identity independent of it.”). 
 178. See Raymond Cowin, Opinion, All Lives Matter, POLICE MAG. (Apr. 10, 
2015), http://www.policemag.com/channel/patrol/articles/2015/04/all-lives 
-matter.aspx. 
 179. George Yancy & Judith Butler, Opinion, What’s Wrong With ‘All Lives 
Matter ’?, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2015), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/ 
2015/01/12/whats-wrong-with-all-lives-matter; Flanders, supra note 154; see 
also Cowin, supra note 178.  
 180. Yancy & Butler, supra note 179.  
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so disproportionately encounter police violence does not merely 
alienate the group, but rather erases them all together. Even in 
the midst of a visible struggle for equality, Blacks were told that 
their claims for a dignified life, free of state violence and abuse, 
will never be independently sufficient; their claims must be sub-
sumed into claims that also include Whites if they are to be rec-
ognized at all. 
The withholding of dignity through the rejection of identity 
is similarly reflected in legal doctrine. The Court’s colorblindness 
ideology, for example, prohibits institutions from considering ra-
cial identity while permitting those institutions to take into ac-
count other forms of social identity. As such, the colorblindness 
ideology stigmatizes and demeans the dignity of those who iden-
tify by race, denying them the full expression of their identity, 
and significantly restricting their agency regarding how they 
present themselves to the state, and to others.181 
Outside the context of race, the Court’s same-sex marriage 
jurisprudence locates a right to same-sex marriage not in the 
equal status of gays and lesbians, but rather on the right of eve-
ryone to access the dignity of marriage.182 By framing the right 
so generally, Justice Kennedy hoped to prompt members of the 
majority to contemplate the potential pain of denied access in 
their own lives and to respond in sympathy for those actually 
denied.183 
Full dignity, however, requires more than drawing on famil-
iarity and self-interest. Rather, equality requires that individu-
als believe others are owed dignity and respect even when they 
are not like us—and that the parts of their identity which differ 
from ours are nevertheless dignified, worthy, and valuable.184 In 
 
 181. Elise Boddie, The Indignities of Colorblindness, 64 UCLA L. REV. DIS-
COURSE 64, 67 (2016). 
 182. “The fundamental liberties protected by the [Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment] . . . extend to certain personal choices central to indi-
vidual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal 
identity and beliefs.” Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597 (2015). “The 
lifelong union of a man and woman always has promised nobility and dignity to 
all persons . . . .” Id. at 2594. “There is dignity in the bond between two men or 
two women who seek to marry . . . .” Id. at 2599. “They ask for equal dignity in 
the eyes of the law. The Constitution grants them that right.” Id. at 2608. 
 183. Yoshino, supra note 23, at 794 (discussing the appeal of universal 
claims like dignity or liberty, which “performs the empathy it seeks”). 
 184. See Catharine MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 
YALE L.J. 1281, 1290–91 (1991) (decrying the conventional legal command that 
“like cases be treated alike” for implicitly conveying that “women . . . are enti-
tled to equal treatment mainly to the degree they are the same as men.”). The 
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this sense, then, bestowing dignity must be specifically respon-
sive to the basis on which dignity was denied. It is through this 
acknowledgement that we broaden our conception of humanity 
and genuinely recognize intrinsic worth of all humans. 
Ultimately, despite the impoverished view of minoritized 
identity embedded in our equality doctrine, affirming black ra-
cial identity can positively impact individuals, can inspire and 
encourage democratic participation, and is central to notions of 
dignity. 
III.  USING IDENTITY   
 Addressing negative conceptions of racial identity is cer-
tainly beneficial for social reasons that are tethered to, but nev-
ertheless distinct from, formal law and policy. Less stigmatizing 
black racial identity, for example, can address the faulty and in-
grained mental associations between notions of deviance and ra-
cial identity performance185 that subject Blacks to racial dispar-
ities in contexts ranging from school discipline186 to criminal 
 
movement to create empathy by presenting marginalized identities as “just like” 
non-marginalized identities can backfire, reaffirming hierarchy in undesirable 
ways. The marriage equality movement, for example, featured White, upper- 
class plaintiffs in an attempt to secure success in the court of public opinion. In 
the process, however, wealthy, White, two-parent households were further in-
scribed as “normal” and deserving, while people of color, the poor, and individ-
uals within alternate family arrangements were erased from the images repre-
senting the marriage equality movement, and their identity-informed concerns 
ignored. Scott Skinner-Thompson, The “Straight” Faces of Same-Sex Marriage, 
SLATE (Apr. 24, 2015), http://www.slate.com/blogs/outward/2015/04/24/the_ 
straight_faces_of_same_sex_marriage.html (describing the commitment of 
same-sex marriage movement attorneys to presenting White, professional, mid-
dle- to upper-class, and widowed plaintiffs before the Court, even after it was 
clear that the Court was prepared to proclaim marriage equality the law of the 
land, and thus missing an opportunity to transition from “a movement about 
marriage to a movement about justice”); see also Darren Hutchinson, “Not With-
out Political Power”: Gays and Lesbians, Equal Protection and the Suspect Class 
Doctrine, 65 ALA. L. REV. 975, 1021–23 (2014) (detailing the disproportionate 
impact of poverty, homophobia, and racism on low-income gays and lesbians of 
color). 
 185. Dress, speech patterns, and even artistic preferences can dictate 
whether individuals place black men in the “good black man,” or “bad black 
man” categories. The former distances himself from blackness and embraces 
white norms, while the latter is crime-prone and hypersexual. Frank Rudy 
Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity: Intersectionality, Assimilation, 
Identity Performance, and Hierarchy, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 853, 875–85 (2006) 
(arguing that bipolar representations of heterosexual black men as either crime-
prone and hypersexual, or “good,” are used to help resolve the white main-
stream’s post-Civil Rights anxiety about inclusion and exclusion of black men). 
 186. Blacks are overrepresented in public school suspensions and corporal 
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justice.187 Moreover, equality movements anchored in identity, 
from Black Power to Black Lives Matter, have made important 
socio-political gains, pushing civil rights leaders and presiden-
tial candidates alike to name and confront racial privilege, sys-
tematic racism, and anti-black structural discrimination on na-
tional stages.188 
Negative conceptions of racial identity, however, also shape 
formal law in ways that warp equality doctrines and undermine 
responses to structural race discrimination. The particularities 
of identity constructs are needed to counter racial asymmetries 
in the law that are hidden when universal frameworks are em-
ployed. Moreover, positive legal engagement with black racial 
identity in ways that do not reinscribe notions of black deficit, 
and are instead informed by pride and celebratory blackness, is 
key to crafting successful responses to structural discrimination. 
A. A NEED FOR THE PARTICULAR 
A legal commitment to universality has developed in the 
void left by the Court’s shift away from identity. Universal ap-
proaches to equality are informed by a movement away from 
identity groups as forming the baseline for anti-discrimination 
and equality law. As such, all individuals, without reference to 
their identity, are guaranteed a set of rights, benefits, or protec-
tions.189 
 
punishment, with schools (1) more likely to implement extremely punitive dis-
cipline and zero-tolerance policies; and (2) less likely to use mild discipline and 
restorative techniques, as the percentage of black students enrolled increases. 
These relationships operate independently of economic status, gender, crime sa-
lience, urban residence, and teacher training. Theresa Glennon, Race, Educa-
tion, and the Construction of a Disabled Class, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1237, 1240; 
Kelly Welch & Allison Ann Payne, Racial Threat and Punitive School Discipline, 
57 SOC. PROBS. 25, 35–41 (2010). 
 187. See ALEXANDER, supra note 156 (describing the criminal justice sys-
tem’s impact on African American communities). 
 188. See infra note 199 and accompanying text. Although often perceived as 
distinct, scholars increasingly characterize the civil rights movement and the 
Black Power movement as interconnected movements that played off of each 
other.  
 189. See, e.g., Bagenstos, supra note 21, at 2842–43 (defining a “universalist 
approach” to civil rights law as one that either guarantees a uniform floor of 
rights or benefits for all persons or, at least, guarantees a set of rights or bene-
fits to a broad group of people not defined according to the identity axes high-
lighted by our anti-discrimination laws); Jessica A. Clarke, Beyond Equality? 
Against the Universal Turn in Workplace Protections, 86 IND. L.J. 1219, 1221–
22 (2011) (identifying a “universal turn” in workplace protections as part of a 
“larger trend of expanding civil rights protections beyond rules that prohibit 
discrimination to rules of universal applicability”). There is also debate about 
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Vulnerability theory, for example, mobilizes around a con-
cept of shared, inevitable vulnerability among all humans.190 It 
responds to the realization that disadvantage, produced inde-
pendently of racial and gender biases in many instances, pro-
vides an important political tool.191 Under the vulnerability 
framework, institutional arrangements are the targets of protest 
and political mobilization, thus eliminating the need to have in-
terest groups organized around identities.192 
The concept of dignity similarly moves away from identity, 
and is often deployed in human rights discourse.193 U.S. courts 
have been influenced by the idea of dignity, with scholars like 
Kenji Yoshino arguing that the Supreme Court has responded to 
pluralism anxiety by moving away from group-based equality 
claims under the guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments to “dignity claims” rooted in the due process guarantees 
of the same;194 these claims reflect the interconnectedness of 
equality and liberty.195 
Identity constructs, however, are still needed to destabilize 
and ultimately eliminate asymmetries in law and policy. Non-
identitarian frames, for example, fail to engage or interrogate 
the dual realities of entrenched deficit and affirmation in racial 
identities for Blacks and Whites, respectively. In their focus on 
all citizens, appeals to universal equality do not disrupt the im-
plicit understanding of Whites as the universal subject, and thus 
 
what constitutes a universal movement. Labor movements, for example, might 
be considered a departure from identity, although plausibly still grounded in 
the identity category of the poor or working-class. The presidential campaign of 
2016 highlighted uncertainty about such movements, with Senator Bernie 
Sanders campaigning on a set of economic redistribution policies which sparked 
debate about what sorts of movements—race or economics—would improve 
long-term outcomes for Blacks in the United States. See Cedric Johnson, An 
Open Letter to Ta-Nehisi Coates and the Liberals Who Love Him, JACOBIN (Feb. 
3, 2016), http://jacobinmag.com/2016/02/ta-nehisi-coates-case-for-reparations 
-bernie-sanders-racism; Lester K. Spence, Reparations and the Racial Residual, 
BALT. CITY PAPER (Feb. 2, 2016), http://www.citypaper.com/news/mobtownbeat/ 
bcp-020316-reparations-lester-spence-20160202-story.html.  
 190. Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equal-
ity in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 17 (2008). 
 191. Id.  
 192. Id. 
 193. The language of dignity has been central in both the United Nations 
Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. McCrudden, supra 
note 176, at 656. 
 194. Yoshino, supra note 23, at 748–49. 
 195. These claims are further characterized as either “liberty-based” or 
“equality-based” dignity claims, depending on whether the liberty or equality 
dimension of any one claim is ascendant. Id. at 749. 
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fail to account for how white racial identity is privileged in the 
law, even as it is made invisible. Calls to move away from iden-
tity, without making the affirmation of white racial identity less 
opaque, will only leave white supremacy undisturbed, while 
eliminating a useful tool to identify and focus on racial subordi-
nation of non-Whites. 
Moreover, the move from the particular to the universal, and 
from identity to dignity or vulnerability, has the potential to fur-
ther distance law and legal analysis from the continuing signifi-
cance of identity for racialized minorities and from the process 
of bestowing full dignity. In the shift, racialized minorities are 
misrecognized—their identities deemed insufficiently compel-
ling as central to claims for equality and dignity, and devoid of 
value for identity holders at all. This, in turn, limits societal im-
agination as we contemplate solutions to inequality in our com-
munities.196 
Identity scholars and activists, many of whom grapple with 
the impact of racial identity in their own lives, have not pushed 
for a shift from the particular to the universal—in fact, many 
have forcefully argued against it.197 Founders of Black Lives 
Matter, for example, could have headlined the movement “All 
Lives Matter,” or some other slogan focused on the universal 
harm of police brutality. Instead, they chose, even in the midst 
of a protest movement focusing on subordination and dehuman-
ization of blackness, to characterize blackness as positive and 
 
 196. Nor does a shift to universality placate Whites suffering from pluralism 
anxiety, racial exhaustion, or both. The “anti-balkanization” approach, for ex-
ample, that has informed limitations placed on race-conscious remedies did not 
successfully prevent additional rounds of challenges to affirmative action in 
2012 and 2015. Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Racial Exhaustion, 86 WASH. U. L. 
REV. 917, 922 (2008) (defining racial exhaustion); Yoshino, supra note 23, at 
751–52 (defining pluralism anxiety); see Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 
S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (holding that a white student was not discriminated against 
by a school’s admission process); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 133 S. Ct. 
2411 (2013) (remanding white student’s discrimination claim because the Fifth 
Circuit did not apply the strict scrutiny test to the school’s admission process). 
 197. See, e.g., Frank Rudy Cooper, Always Already Suspect: Revising Vulner-
ability Theory, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1339 (2015) (rejecting vulnerability theory for 
its post-identity approach to identity-based problems such as racial profiling); 
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Preventing Balkanization or Facilitating Racial 
Domination: A Critique of the New Equal Protection, 22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 
1 (2015) (critiquing the “anti-balkinization” aims of universal constructs like 
dignity as actually facilitating racial domination).  
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valuable in an example of self-identification as a source of vali-
dation and identity.198 And justifiably so—the decidedly identi-
tarian movement has centered the concerns of black people more 
forcefully than any movement in recent history, including advo-
cacy in support of affirmative action or voting rights.  
Indeed, Black Lives Matter activists forced the 2016 presi-
dential election candidates to engage, however reluctantly, with 
questions about mass incarceration, police brutality, access to 
education, income inequality, structural discrimination, sys-
temic racism, racial privilege, and intersectionality during their 
campaigns.199 Even Supreme Court Justices have been influ-
enced by the movement, infusing judicial opinions with the lan-
guage and themes of the protests.200 At the same time, public 
 
 198. Harris, supra note 23, at 1766.  
 199. See, e.g., Kali Holloway, Hillary Clinton Tries To Grasp ‘Intersectional-
ity’ To Understand the Mix of Race, Gender and Class—Does She Get It?, AL-
TERNET (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.alternet.org/gender/hillary-clinton-tries 
-grasp-intersectionality-understand-mix-race-gender-and-class-does-she (de-
tailing Clinton’s engagement with the concept of intersectionality); Victoria M. 
Massie, Hillary Clinton Said “Systemic Racism” in Tonight’s Speech. That’s Ma-
jor, VOX (July 29, 2016), http://www.vox.com/2016/7/29/12320118/hillary 
-clinton-speech-systemic-racism; Issues: Racial Justice, BERNIE SANDERS 
(2016), https://berniesanders.com/issues/racial-justice (revealing a more de-
tailed racial justice platform after a series of challenges by Black Lives Matter 
activists); Carimah Townes, How the Democratic Presidential Candidates Re-
sponded to the Black Lives Matter Question, THINK PROGRESS (Oct. 14, 2015), 
https://thinkprogress.org/how-the-democratic-presidential-candidates 
-responded-to-the-black-lives-matter-question-91ce0cf2d588 (detailing the re-
sponses of Democratic presidential candidates to questions about the Black 
Lives Matter movement); John Walker, Did Hillary Clinton Blow the White 
Privilege Question?, SPLINTER (Jan. 11, 2016), http://splinternews.com/did 
-hillary-clinton-blow-the-white-privilege-question-1793854022 (detailing Hil-
lary Clinton’s response to a town hall meeting question about white privilege in 
her life).  
 200. In her dissent to Utah v. Strieff, Justice Sotomayor not only cited to 
authors who write about race and racial subordination, but also critiqued state-
sanctioned racial profiling and police brutality by reference to rhetorical themes 
deployed by the movement. 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070–71 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dis-
senting) (“[I]t is no secret that people of color are disproportionate victims of 
this type of scrutiny . . . . By legitimizing the conduct that produces this double 
consciousness, this case tells everyone . . . that your body is subject to invasion 
while courts excuse the violation of your rights. It implies that you are not a 
citizen of a democracy but the subject of the carceral state . . . the countless 
people who are routinely targeted by police . . . are the canaries in the coal mine 
whose deaths, civil and literal, warn us that no one can breathe in this atmos-
phere . . . . Until their voices matter too, our justice system will continue to be 
anything but.”). 
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displays of celebratory blackness continue to enter the main-
stream.201 
The absence, therefore, of voices of color in advocating for a 
jurisprudential shift from the particular to the universal is of no 
surprise. Moreover, given the work racialized identities have put 
into turning their stigmatized racial identities into sources of re-
silience, a turn away from identity is all the more troubling. In 
light of the state’s refusal to bestow dignity on black communi-
ties, black individuals and families had to bestow dignity on 
themselves, often through messages of racial socialization. Alt-
hough this bestowal through positive racial identity formation 
was not properly recognized in social science literature, commu-
nities of color nevertheless used the law, among other means, to 
make claims for protection, for recognition, and for affirmation; 
to lay claim to identity, and thus dignity. Shifts to universal con-
structs that do not fully account for this work not only under-
mine these hard-fought claims, but are acts of dispossession. 
B. REFRAMING THE “HARMS” OF RACIAL CLASSIFICATION 
Successfully preventing, however, a shift to universal con-
structs is insufficient. Rather, anxieties about black racial iden-
tity that inform legal thought regarding racial classifications, 
stigma and essentialism, must also be addressed, lest the posi-
tive potential of identity be undermined. 
1. Stigma 
When assessing the legitimacy of both discrimination claims 
and state attempts to remediate racial inequality, courts are in-
formed by two complementary notions regarding the impact of 
identity. The first is the dominant way of thinking about racial 
identity among Whites—that of having no identity. The second 
is the deficit-oriented frame through which we typically view mi-
noritized identity. 
 
 201. See, e.g., Remarks by the President at Howard University Commence-
ment Ceremony, THE WHITE HOUSE: PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA (May 7, 2016), 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2016/05/07/remarks 
-president-howard-university-commencement-ceremony (“First of all . . . be con-
fident in your heritage. Be confident in your blackness.”). 
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“Transparency” is the failure of Whites to recognize their 
own racial identity, as well as a tendency to assume that the ex-
periences of privileged Whites are normative.202 Unlike racially 
minoritized groups that form racial identities around shared cul-
tural norms, racial oppression, or histories of oppression, the ra-
cial identities of white Americans typically become salient only 
when juxtaposed against other non-white racial groups.203 White 
students, for example, often don’t understand racism as affecting 
them because they are not people of color; they do not see “white-
ness” as a racial identity.204 
At the same time, non-white racial identity has historically 
been the basis on which individuals have been denied access to 
quality housing, education, job opportunities, and healthcare, 
with black racial identity, in particular, understood as degraded 
 
 202. Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind, but Now I See”: White Race Conscious-
ness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 969–
73 (1993) (describing the transparency phenomenon). 
 203. Davis, supra note 102, at 701–02. Despite everyday transparency, white 
racial identity has, of course, been salient at key points in the history of the 
Americas. Theodore Allen has argued that the bourgeoisie response to the po-
tential for black-white labor solidarity in the early decades of the eighteenth 
century was to cultivate a sense of white racial identity to which social privi-
leges could attach. Today, race may again be taking on heightened significance 
for white Americans. THEODORE W. ALLEN, CLASS STRUGGLE AND THE ORIGIN 
OF RACIAL SLAVERY: THE INVENTION OF THE WHITE RACE (2006). Reverse dis-
crimination claims have prompted litigation, with Whites increasingly alleging 
not only that they are discriminated against on the basis of race, but that dis-
crimination against Whites is a bigger problem than discrimination against 
Blacks. FRED L. PINCUS, REVERSE DISCRIMINATION: DISMANTLING THE MYTH, 
at x–xi, 3–9 (2003); Michael I. Norton & Samuel R. Sommers, Whites See Racism 
as a Zero-Sum Game That They Are Now Losing, 6 PERSP. ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 
215, 215 (2011); Does Affirmative Action Punish Whites?, NBC NEWS (Apr. 28, 
2009), http://www.nbcnews.com/id/30462129/ns/us_news-life/t/does-affirmative 
-action-punish-whites (describing recent reverse discrimination cases). Moreo-
ver, debate continues about the extent to which Donald Trump’s election as 
President was rooted in the grievances of white Americans. Mona Chalabi, 
Trump’s Angry White Men—and Why There Are More of Them Than You Think, 
GUARDIAN (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2016/jan/08/ 
angry-white-men-love-donald-trump (describing Trump’s appeal among mid-
dle-aged, working or middle-class men). But see Heather Digby Parton, The 
Truth About Donald Trump’s Angry White Men: Inside the Media Narrative that 
the Media Doesn’t Understand, SALON (Mar. 28, 2016), http://www.salon.com/ 
2016/03/28/the_truth_about_donald_trumps_angry_white_men_inside_the_ 
media_narrative_that_the_media_doesnt_understand (arguing that angst 
about “misunderstood and underserved” white men is decades-old, dating back 
to the 1960s, and continuing throughout the 1970s to the present). 
 204. Peggy McIntosh, White Privilege and Male Privilege: A Personal Ac-
count of Coming To See Correspondences Through Work in Women’s Studies, in 
CRITICAL WHITE STUDIES: LOOKING BEHIND THE MIRROR 291, 297 (Richard Del-
gado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1997). 
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and inferior.205 Accordingly, categorizations regarding racial 
identity are typically considered inherently suspect because of 
the potential suggestion that either members of a particular 
identity group are unfit to receive a benefit distributed by the 
state, or that receipt of the benefit reflects erroneous stereotypes 
regarding incompetency and dependency among members of the 
group.206  
It is no surprise then, that legal analysis of race-conscious 
policies proceeds from the conclusion that the racial classifica-
tions that necessarily underlie such policies are necessarily stig-
matizing and harmful, and that state recognition of identity 
group membership is inherently undesirable. Concerns about 
black stigma are addressed in virtually all affirmative action 
cases before the Court.207 In a dissenting opinion to Grutter v. 
Bollinger, for example, Justice Thomas suggested that stigma 
exists even when the stigmatized are actually “beneficiaries” of 
race-conscious state action, noting that, “When blacks take posi-
tions in the highest places of government, industry, or academia, 
it is an open question today whether their skin color played a 
part in their advancement.”208 Justice Thomas further noted 
that stigma is an important factor when assessing affirmative 
action because “either . . . [race-conscious state action] . . . did 
play a role, in which case the person may be deemed ‘otherwise 
unqualified,’ or did not, in which case asking the question un-
 
 205. Those at the bottom of the hierarchy are subjected to a tainted (or stig-
matized) identity. In the United States, the stigma particularly falls on those 
ascribed the identity “black.” Peter J. Rubin, Reconnecting Doctrine and Pur-
pose: A Comprehensive Approach to Strict Scrutiny After Adarand and Shaw, 
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 20 (2000); see also Gowder, supra note 6, at 339–54 (can-
vassing social science literature illustrating the stigma attached to black racial 
identity, and using a cognitive hierarchical model to argue that “the notion that 
blackness is worth less than whiteness seems to be built into the American psy-
che”). 
 206. Rubin, supra note 205, at 20–21. Of course, there are also concerns that 
racial identity is being used to benefit a particular racial group, although “ben-
efit” for a white racial group is less likely to be stigmatized as due to laziness, 
unwarranted dependency, or inherent incapacity; see Girardeau Spann, Affirm-
ative Action and Discrimination, 39 HOW. L.J. 1, 35–36 (finding that virtually 
no affirmative action program had ever been struck down on account of the way 
it stigmatizes Whites). 
 207. Spann, supra note 206 (finding that the question of whether affirmative 
action stigmatizes or stereotypes its intended beneficiaries is discussed in vir-
tually all affirmative action decisions). 
 208. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 373 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting 
in part). 
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fairly marks blacks who would succeed without discrimina-
tion.”209 
Stigma is considered even in race-conscious programs that 
do not take race into account for purposes of individual assess-
ment. In Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle 
School District No. 1, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a controlled-
choice school assignment plan in which race was considered 
whenever the racial demographics of particular schools began to 
skew toward white or non-white racial isolation.210 In a concur-
ring opinion, Judge Kozinski noted that the controlled-choice 
plan had none of the problems of typical race-conscious affirma-
tive action programs: the plan was not meant to suppress minor-
ities, nor did it have that effect, as the plan was meant to pro-
mote integration; there was no attempt to give a particular group 
additional political power based on skin color; there was no com-
petition among races, and no race was given preference over an-
other; and although denial of preferred school assignment might 
have been disappointing, it bore no relationship at all to that in-
dividual student’s aptitude or ability.211  
On review by the Supreme Court, however, the controlled-
choice plan was struck down as unconstitutional.212 And in a con-
curring opinion meant to carve out spaces in which race-con-
scious school assignment plans might be permissible, Justice 
Kennedy cautioned against the harms of defining students by 
race.213 Justice Kennedy warned that “reduc[ing] [an] individual 
to an assigned racial identity for differential treatment is among 
the most pernicious actions” government can take, as our consti-
tution insists that “the individual, child or adult, can find his 
own identity, can define her own persona . . . without state in-
tervention that classifies on the basis of his race or the color of 
her skin.”214 In cautioning against the problems of essentialism 
that are typically assumed to accompany identity, Justice Ken-
nedy also implicitly trades on the “stigma” that may follow when 
individuals are categorized as members of minoritized groups.215 
 
 209. Id. 
 210. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F.3d 
1162 (9th Cir. 2005), rev’d, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
 211. Id. at 1194 (Kozinski, J., concurring). 
 212. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 
701 (2007). 
 213. Id. at 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
 214. Id. at 795–97.  
 215. Id. at 798. 
 172 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:127 
 
How might these cases, however, have turned out if black 
racial identity was perceived as curative, protective, and valua-
ble for people of color? Indeed, research on the impact of “stigma” 
on students of color suggests that they themselves generally do 
not feel stigmatized by either race-conscious admissions policies 
or their identification as black. In Shape of the River, researchers 
William Bowen and Derek Bok documented the impact of access 
to academically selective colleges and universities as facilitated 
by race-conscious admissions policies on minorities.216 Drawing 
on a forty-year longitudinal study of more than 80,000 under-
graduate students who matriculated at twenty-eight academi-
cally selective colleges and universities in the fall of 1976 and 
the fall of 1989, research found that, although more than a few 
black students “unquestionably suffer some degree of discomfort 
from being beneficiaries of the admissions process,” the benefi-
ciaries themselves ultimately do not think they have been 
harmed as a result of the policies.217  
In fact, seventy-five percent of the 1989 matriculates who 
scored over 1300 on their SATs believed that their colleges 
should place a “great deal” of emphasis on racial diversity, while 
seventy-seven percent of black graduates who ranked in the top 
third of their class were “very satisfied” with their undergradu-
ate educational experience,218 thus undermining the assertions 
of Justice Thomas and others that high-performing minorities 
will always suffer insecurity.219 Furthermore, researcher Jen-
nifer Hochschild reports that while four percent of “well-off” 
Blacks believe affirmative action hurts recipients, fifty-five per-
cent of the same group believes affirmative action helps recipi-
ents.220 If black students are stigmatized, it has neither damp-
ened their commitment to race-conscious admission policies nor 
left them unsatisfied with their undergraduate experience.  
To be sure, black academics and jurists have argued that 
race-conscious admissions policies “demean” people of color by 
perpetuating stereotypes of black people as unable to compete 
 
 216. WILLIAM G. BOWEN & DEREK BOK, THE SHAPE OF THE RIVER: LONG-
TERM CONSEQUENCES OF CONSIDERING RACE IN COLLEGE AND UNIVERSITY AD-
MISSIONS (1998). 
 217. Id. at 265. 
 218. Id.  
 219. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 349 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing in part). 
 220. BOWEN & BOK, supra note 216, at 265.  
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with Whites.221 The stigma of “racial inferiority” shouldered by 
people of color, however, predates race-conscious programs, and 
is linked, not to solutions that try to respond to the white su-
premacy that prompted that stigma, but to white supremacy it-
self.222  
Moreover, concerns about stigma are linked exclusively to 
enduring and impoverished views about black racial identity. 
The Court does not, for example, engage the curative aspects of 
black racial identity.223 And, the Court rarely, if ever, engages 
questions about whether race-conscious policies meant to wrest 
away unearned white privilege and advantage stigmatize self-
identifying Whites. Similarly, the Brown court did not engage 
the stigmatizing harm that comes from allowing Whites to main-
tain a segregated school system which subordinated people of 
color.224 Indeed, equal protection doctrine does not engage white 
stigma because it responds exclusively to “intentional” discrimi-
nation, ensuring that even Whites who are complicit in “unin-
tentional” discrimination will not be stigmatized as racist.225 In-
stead, discussion regarding the impact of racial identity 
categories and race-conscious initiatives on Whites is typically 
informed by the trope of “innocent Whites” who unfairly shoul-
der the burden of race-conscious programs.226  
 
 221. See, e.g., Grutter, 539 U.S. at 354 (Thomas, J., dissenting in part) (sug-
gesting that black people who take positions in the highest places of govern-
ment, industry, or academia must be content with whether their skin color 
played a role in their advancement); STEPHEN L. CARTER, REFLECTIONS OF AN 
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION BABY 50 (1991) (“[T]he durable and demeaning stereotype 
of black people as unable to compete with white ones is reinforced by advocates 
of certain forms of affirmative action.”). 
 222. See, e.g., CHARLES R. LAWRENCE III & MARI J. MATSUDA, WE WON’T GO 
BACK: MAKING THE CASE FOR AFFIRMATIVE ACTION 129–30 (1997) (encouraging 
minorities to recognize white supremacy as “the real source of the stigma and 
confront it directly”). 
 223. See, e.g., Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 
551 U.S. 701, 720 (2007) (affirming the Court’s negative view on racial classifi-
cations by calling such policies “pernicious”). 
 224. See Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 225. See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text. 
 226. The Court has affirmed this narrative in a line of affirmative action 
cases. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341 (2003) (affirming that “there are 
serious problems of justice connected with the idea of preference itself,” and that 
“[e]ven remedial race-based government action generally ‘remains subject to 
continuing oversight to assure that it will work the least harm possible to other 
innocent persons competing for the benefit’” (quoting Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 298, 308 (1978))); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 
476 U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (“No one doubts that there has been serious racial dis-
crimination in this country. But as the basis for imposing discriminatory legal 
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Courts are capable, then, of embracing alternate concep-
tions of racial identity, especially if one considers the ways that 
white racial identity is typically framed. Ultimately, legal actors 
should take cues from the research reflecting the value of black 
racial identity as articulated by black people. Black people are 
neither ashamed of blackness, nor stigmatized by their identifi-
cation with either their racial identity or race-conscious pro-
grams. If courts engage positive racial identity, concerns about 
stigma in the law recede, undermining implicit assumptions re-
garding blackness that inform our assessments of stigma, and 
strengthening the popular and legal support for race-conscious 
programming. 
2. Essentialism 
In the late Nineteenth century, W. E. B. Du Bois advocated 
for the conservation and cultivation of racial identities and com-
munities, arguing for recognition and validation of a unique 
black experience from which important contributions to civiliza-
tion and humanity could be drawn.227 At the end of his essay, 
The Conservation of Races, Du Bois wrote: 
We believe that the Negro people, as a race, have a contribution to 
make to civilization and humanity, which no other race can make . . . . 
We believe it the duty of the Americans of Negro descent . . . to main-
tain their race identity until this mission of the Negro people is accom-
plished, and the ideal of human brotherhood has become a practical 
possibility.228 
Du Bois’s arguments are justifiably subject to legitimate 
concerns that affirming identity investment through our legal 
frameworks, equal protection or otherwise, may reify, conserve, 
 
remedies that work against innocent people, societal discrimination is insuffi-
cient and over-expansive.”); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 
294 n.34 (1978) (highlighting the unfairness of asking “innocent persons . . . to 
endure . . . [deprivation as] the price of membership in the dominant majority”). 
See generally Osamudia James, White Like Me: The Negative Impact of the Di-
versity Rationale on White Identity Formation, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 425 (2014) (ar-
guing that the diversity rationale affirms and aggravates this phenomenon, 
thus undermining both the development of positive white racial identity and 
hindering attempts in higher education to maximize diversity among students). 
 227. Anthony Appiah, The Uncompleted Argument: Du Bois and the Illusion 
of Race, 12 CRITICAL INQUIRY 21, 24 (1985). 
 228. Id. (citing W. E. B. Du Bois, The Conservation of Races, in W. E. B. DU 
BOIS SPEAKS: SPEECHES AND ADDRESSES 1890–1910, at 84 (Philip S. Foner ed., 
1970)). Du Bois was motivated by a desire to determine the meaning and “truth” 
about race, wrenching it from Whites who had defined it up until then, and 
turning it into a source of pride and solidarity for Blacks. Id. at 22–24, 36. 
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or essentialize the idea of race in troubling ways.229 Indeed, 
much of popular discourse, political rhetoric, research, and pub-
lic policy are grounded in false notions of race as a biological 
fact230 or social reality with clearly cut delineations. 
Admittedly, in an attempt to create a flexible doctrinal 
framework, legal actors must oversimplify identity at the cost of 
more complex and nuanced understandings.231 Effective identity 
politics require not only that Blacks be allowed to live a dignified 
life, or be treated with equal dignity despite being black, but that 
Blacks be respected as Blacks.232 Accordingly, scholars rightly 
raise concerns that such a goal creates scripts that go along with 
the identity—specific requirements regarding black identity ex-
pression.233  
Essentialism, however, cannot necessarily be avoided when 
navigating legal claims for racial equality. Although it is true 
that “bureaucratic categories of identity must come up short be-
fore the vagaries of actual people’s lives,”234 it is also true that 
essentialization is not so much about what every black person is, 
but about what every black person encounters. Although class, 
education, wealth, language, and even geography impact how 
anti-blackness is perceived or experienced, both navigating a ra-
cialized identity and encountering anti-blackness are ultimately 
phenomena to which all Blacks are exposed regardless of 
whether or not they choose to engage it.  
Moreover, identity claims in the law are made to counter 
anti-blackness, regardless of whether every single black person 
experiences or performs blackness in the same way. Accordingly, 
identity does important work in service not only of racial justice, 
 
 229. See Yoshino, supra note 23, at 795 (“[W]hen courts protect a trait as 
part of a group’s identity, they strengthen the very stereotypes they mean to 
disestablish.”). 
 230. See, e.g., DOROTHY ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION: HOW SCIENCE, POLI-
TICS, AND BIG BUSINESS RE-CREATE RACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
(2011) (examining how the myth of biological race is advanced by purportedly 
cutting-edge science, race-specific drugs, and DNA bases, all of which ultimately 
promotes inequality). 
 231. Lucas, supra note 23, at 1628 (citing MARTHA MINOW, NOT ONLY FOR 
MYSELF: IDENTITY, POLITICS, AND THE LAW 40–41 (1997)) (“[G]aps and conflicts 
among self-identification, internal group membership practices, and external, 
oppressive assignments have given rise to poignant and persistent narratives 
of personal and political pain and struggle . . . [but also] inconsistent meanings 
of group membership.”). 
 232. See Appiah, supra note 130, at 161; see also supra notes 176–85 and 
accompanying text. 
 233. Appiah, supra note 130, at 161–62. 
 234. Id. at 163. 
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but also in democratic recognition and the bestowal of dignity. 
To the extent that racial marginalization occurs consistently 
across personal and political narratives of pain and struggle,235 
embedding notions of identity in our legal framework is not an 
issue of essentialization, but rather an accurate reflection of so-
cial construction. If so, the question is not whether essentialism 
is bad, but whether it can be considered temporary and contin-
gent, and, if so, “how, where, and by whom is it being de-
ployed.”236 
Again, understanding our perceptions of minoritized racial 
identities is key. Our deficit-oriented approach to identity in gen-
eral, and minoritized identity in particular, causes legal actors 
and policymakers to embed in the law the notions of racial iden-
tity informed primarily by the “harm” of being raced Black. 
These negative notions then inform essentialism concerns. If, 
however, we import more positive notions of black racial iden-
tity—absent the automatic and exclusive concern with stigma—
essentialism concerns are mitigated, resulting in a more clear-
eyed assessment of identity. 
Identity is more than “inscri[ption] in the law and in other 
political registers [the] historical and present pain” in which peo-
ple become invested.237 Rather, recognition of identity and its ac-
companying investment for non-Whites serves as acknowledge-
ment of the ongoing salience of race in a way that allows for 
proper democratic recognition and state-sponsored dignity. This 
understanding of racial identity could be, problematically, a 
“blackness that whiteness created,”238 a suggestion that minori-
tized racial identity is always primarily a reaction to racial sub-
ordination by Whites. Admittedly, responses to racial marginal-
ization do inform identity development.239 But the value of 
identity, and the way that identity can positively function in the 
 
 235. MINOW, supra note 231, at 41. 
 236. Trina Grillo, Anti-Essentialism and Intersectionality: Tools To Disman-
tle the Master ’s House, 10 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 16, 21 n.26 (1995); Angela 
P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 
581, 586 (1990) (“Even a jurisprudence based on multiple consciousness must 
categorize . . . . My suggestion only is that we make our categories explicitly 
tentative, relational, and unstable . . . .”); Harris, supra note 23, at 1763 (“The 
questions pertaining to definitions of race then are not principally biological or 
genetic, but social and political: what must be addressed is who is defining, how 
is the definition constructed, and why is the definition being propounded.”). 
 237. See Brown, supra note 23, at 400. 
 238. I thank my colleague, Charlton Copeland, for posing this question and 
insisting that I grapple with a response. 
 239. See supra notes 99–127 and accompanying text.  
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law to ensure democratic recognition and dignity, are neverthe-
less factors for which scholars must account when assessing 
identity.  
Ultimately, the attempts of Du Bois and others to under-
stand and develop black racial identity outside of a white gaze 
cannot be ignored. Minoritized identities do not depend on exclu-
sion for validation, but they do demand respect both for the iden-
tity and resilience that exclusion has required they produce and 
a legal architecture that is responsive to and affirming of that 
production.  
C. RETHINKING RESPONSES TO STRUCTURAL DISCRIMINATION 
Reframing legal thought regarding identity, stigma, and es-
sentialism will lead to a rethinking about responses to structural 
discrimination. An automatic tendency to understand racial 
identity as impoverished or inherently negative heavily influ-
ences the nature of solutions proposed in response to structural 
racism and discrimination.240 Even among legal actors commit-
ted to progressive outcomes, solutions tend to invoke parity with-
out an accompanying commitment to integrity of community and 
identity. Mass incarceration movements rightly focus on crimi-
nal justice disparities, but discussion regarding the value of 
black racial identity separate and apart from those disparities is 
absent. Judicial decisions decrying blatant racial discrimination 
miss opportunities to celebrate the critical consciousness of mi-
noritized identities that can inform their societal contribu-
tions.241 These imbalances are informed by ingrained beliefs 
 
 240. Structural inequality refers to unexamined but impactful cultural, po-
litical, and social patterns and practices that, although not easily provable as 
intentional, nevertheless result in material and psychic inequality, and is per-
petuated through the transmission of “cultural beliefs, historical legacies, and 
institutional policies within and among public and private organizations.” Wil-
liam M. Wiecek, Structural Racism and the Law in America Today: An Intro-
duction, 100 KY. L.J. 1, 5 (2011). 
 241. See Gotanda, supra note 11, at 57–58 (arguing that in the Supreme 
Court’s rejection of a Florida trial court’s decision to modify a white mother ’s 
custody of her child after she married a black man, the Court failed to affirm 
the possibility that a black stepfather might offer positive value to a child on 
account of the bicultural environment to which he contributed, and critiquing 
the Court for “simply lack[ing] the imagination to consider and separate the 
subordination dimension of race . . . from the positive concept of culture-race”). 
The one exception, of course, is the diversity rationale, where the Court recog-
nizes that value of the contribution for enhancing the intellectual atmosphere 
at predominantly white institutions of higher education. See James, supra note 
226. The framing of this contribution—essentially one of service—can also be 
problematic. Id.  
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about the poor value of minoritized identity that undermine so-
lutions for structural inequality and impose obligations on the 
subordinated that result in a loss of identity.  
Much has been made, for example, of the necessity of hous-
ing and school desegregation as key to ending the education and 
opportunity gaps for people of color. Housing segregation concen-
trates poverty in black neighborhoods, exposing black people to 
the economic, educational, and community instability that often 
accompanies low-income neighborhoods.242 In contrast, poor 
Whites are more likely to be more evenly dispersed among finan-
cially stable communities, ensuring their access to the superior 
educational and work opportunities that can help permanently 
lift them out of poverty.243 
In response, state- and local-run programs often attempt to 
move low-income families out of poor neighborhoods into more 
economically stable communities. Notwithstanding the signifi-
cant material and psychic benefits that come from opportunities 
to move to safer and more economically stable environments, 
these programs pay insufficient attention to the meaning of a 
move to whiter neighborhoods and suburbs for the black families 
who make the change. Researchers James Rosenbaum and Leon-
ard Rubinowitz have studied families from the Gautreaux Initi-
ative, a Chicago housing program that provided vouchers to 
some of the city’s black residents to move to white suburbs.244 
Given the racially charged nature of the 1970s during which the 
families moved, families encountered racially motivated street 
harassment and hostility.245 Some families, having moved to 
 
 242. See Paul A. Jargowsky, The Architecture of Segregation: Civil Unrest, 
the Concentration of Poverty, and Public Policy, CENTURY FOUND. (Aug. 7, 
2015), https://tcf.org/content/report/architecture-of-segregation (reporting on 
racial disparities in poverty, with more than one-in-four poor Blacks, and nearly 
one-in-six of poor Hispanics, living in neighborhoods of extreme poverty, com-
pared to only one-in-thirteen of poor Whites). 
 243. Id. 
 244. LEONARD RUBINOWITZ & JAMES ROSENBAUM, CROSSING THE CLASS 
AND COLOR LINES: FROM PUBLIC HOUSING TO WHITE SUBURBIA (2000). 
 245. Id. at 96–102, 106–07. 
 2017] VALUING IDENTITY 179 
 
neighborhoods that were over ninety percent white,246 were dis-
oriented by the sea of white faces that suddenly surrounded 
them.247  
Other families had decidedly mixed experiences, reporting 
that although most neighbors were friendly, they experienced 
more negative incidents in the suburbs, including harassment, 
racial epithets, and exclusion, than they did in their former com-
munities.248 Suburban movers also reported the variety of ways 
in which sales personnel and others shoppers stigmatized them, 
forcing them to become used to “constant star[ing].”249 Families 
also reported racial hostility in the form of silence, as neighbors 
maintained limited contact and social distance.250 Children often 
encountered mixed messages, with white parents disrupting 
burgeoning relationships and declining to welcome Gautreaux 
children into their homes, even as they welcomed other neigh-
borhood children who were white.251 
Nor are these experiences exclusively explained by class.252 
Researchers Joe Feagin and Melvin Sikes have used interviews 
to draw a portrait of black middle-class life, documenting the 
day-to-day negative impact of racial hostility on black middle-
class Americans in public schools, the job market, and their own 
neighborhoods.253 Feagin and Sikes’s conclusions about racism 
in middle-class black life are as relevant today as they were in 
the 1990s. The homeschooling movement, for example, has 
picked up among African Americans in response to the high costs 
of integration for black students and their families, including 
 
 246. Under the program’s provisions, the families had to move to areas that 
were more than seventy percent white. Because few suburbs, however, ranged 
from seventy to ninety percent white, families in fact moved to suburbs that 
were more than ninety percent white, with an average of ninety-six percent. Id. 
at 75. 
 247. Alana Semuels, Is Ending Segregation the Key To Ending Poverty?, AT-
LANTIC (Feb. 3, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/02/is 
-ending-segregation-the-key-to-ending-poverty/385002. 
 248. RUBINOWITZ & ROSENBAUM, supra note 244, at 106–07. 
 249. Id. at 112. 
 250. Id. at 113. 
 251. Id. at 115–17. 
 252. Unlike more typical Black middle-class suburban dwellers who achieve 
middle-class status before moving to the suburbs, Gautreaux families left the 
inner city for the suburbs without any prior change in economic status; their 
experiences then, were likely influenced by their differing socioeconomic status. 
Id. at 74.  
 253. See generally JOE R. FEAGIN & MELVIN P. SIKES, LIVING WITH RACISM: 
THE BLACK MIDDLE-CLASS EXPERIENCE (1994) (summarizing interviews with 
African Americans about how racism impacts their daily lives). 
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disproportionate discipline and suspension, over-identification 
for special education accompanied by under-identification for 
gifted programming, and whitewashed curricula devoid of people 
of color.254 As author Paula Penn-Nabrit explained: “[T]he truth 
is we began home schooling as a reaction to something white peo-
ple did to us.”255 
Extensive scholarship has also canvassed the pressures put 
on Blacks to “cover” or present themselves and their racial iden-
tity in ways that are palatable to white people in work and social 
settings, with palatable meaning “not salient.” For those who fail 
to meet this obligation, the consequence can be increased racial 
hostility.256 For many Blacks, then, the price of admission to 
white spaces is erasure of identity and silence about the effects 
of that erasure.257 Although scholars have lauded the “multiple 
consciousness” that people of color often develop in order to nav-
igate white spaces while also continuing to retain and value their 
identities and perspectives, the costs of perpetually being 
“strangers in a strange land” are real and high.258 
Recognition of these costs is not a recent phenomenon. As 
early as 1935, W. E. B. Du Bois wrote about education for Blacks, 
noting: 
A mixed school with poor and unsympathetic teachers, with hostile 
public opinion, and no teaching of truth concern black folk, is bad. A 
segregated school with ignorant placeholders, inadequate equipment, 
poor salaries, and wretched housing, is equally bad. Other things being 
equal, the mixed school . . . gives wider contacts; it inspires greater self-
confidence; and suppresses the inferiority complex. But other things 
seldom are equal, and in that case, Sympathy, Knowledge, and the 
Truth, outweigh all that the mixed school can offer.259 
 
 254. Osamudia James, supra note 67, at 1106–19 (detailing the racial hos-
tility to which Black students and families are regularly subject in purportedly 
integrated public schools); infra note 257. 
 255. PAULA PENN-NABRIT, MORNING BY MORNING: HOW WE HOME-
SCHOOLED OUR AFRICAN-AMERICAN SONS TO THE IVY LEAGUE 3 (2003). 
 256. Supra note 114 and accompanying text. 
 257. Osamudia James, Professor of Law and Vice Dean, Univ. of Miami, How 
I Became Comfortable as That Lady: Racial Identity, Silence, and Equality in 
American Public Schools, CANE TALKS (Jan. 29, 2016), http://canetalks 
.miami.edu/cane-talkers/osamudia-james/index.html. 
 258. See, e.g., Mari Matsuda, When the First Quail Calls: Multiple Con-
sciousness as Jurisprudential Method, 11 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 7 (1989) (de-
tailing how people of color filter their life experiences in predominantly White 
settings). 
 259. Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client 
Interests in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470, 515 (1976). 
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In 1976, Derrick Bell wrote about the failure of the civil 
rights establishment, in their ongoing fight to integrate public 
schools, to “consider . . . the limits imposed by the social and po-
litical circumstances under which clients must function even if 
the case is won.”260 Yet, policy prescriptives for racial inequality 
perpetually underappreciate those circumstances. A 2000 online 
exchange among eight scholars about moving out of the ghetto 
prompted only one contribution suggesting that people in impov-
erished residential areas might prefer to remain in their commu-
nities, rather than to move to white ones, for reasons including 
pride in community, historical roots, friendships, or love of urban 
living.261 School integration continues to focus on drawing black 
students out of their neighborhoods and into white communi-
ties.262 And, building off of the blueprint of the Gautreaux pro-
gram, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development 
launched additional housing programs meant to move people of 
color out of their communities, to mixed success.263 
There are many reasons that equality in America has typi-
cally required an assimilative bargain for people of color, includ-
ing issues of political feasibility and scale. But it may also be 
because law and policy operate against background beliefs about 
minoritized racial identity as stigmatized and inferior. Minori-
tized racial identity, however, is “bad” only because it increases 
the likelihood that “bad” things will happen and decreases the 
likelihood that “good” things will happen;264 this is so not be-
 
 260. Id. at 513.  
 261. See Jennifer Hochschild, Moving Out of the Ghetto, BOS. REV. (June 1, 
2000), http://bostonreview.net/forum/moving-out-ghetto/jennifer-hochschild 
-creating-options. 
 262. See generally Bell, supra note 259 (detailing the professional and ethi-
cal concerns in the conflict between civil rights attorneys and the communities 
of color they represented when considering alternatives to desegregation). 
 263. In the 1990s, HUD launched the Moving to Opportunity for Fair Hous-
ing program (MTO). MTO did not fully replicate the positive outcomes of the 
Gautreaux program, although more recent research suggests that long-term 
outcomes will ultimately be more positive than initially understood. Generally, 
there were no effects on the employment and earnings of parents in the MTO 
programs, and few notable effects on their children, although there have been 
some positive effects on physical and mental health. Justin Wolfers, Why the 
New Research on Mobility Matters: An Economist’s View, N.Y. TIMES (May 4, 
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/05/upshot/why-the-new-research-on 
-mobility-matters-an-economists-view.html; Semuels, supra note 247.  
 264. See, e.g., René Bowser, Racial Profiling in Health Care: An Institutional 
Analysis of Medical Treatment Disparities, 7 MICH. J. RACE & L. 79, 83–91 
(2001) (concluding that even after controlling for socioeconomic status, racial 
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cause of the deficiency of blackness, but because of white su-
premacy and its subordinating engagement with black racial 
identity. 
Minoritized racial identity is neither necessarily nor exclu-
sively stigmatizing for people of color, and for many non-Whites, 
racial identity operates as curative, protective, and resiliency-
enhancing. The question, then, is how do we, in our public and 
individual lives, compel and empower state actors and private 
citizens to remedy the material inequalities which are structur-
ally attached to race, while restraining the state in its elimina-
tion of the particularities of identity? Ultimately, equality might 
compel a different bargain than the assimilative one which has 
historically underlined liberation movements in the United 
States. 
The integrative ideal265 is a noble and legitimate goal to-
ward which the country should continue to strive. But based on 
our impoverished conception of black racial identity, our striving 
manifests in marginal integration into white spaces of those non-
Whites who can absorb the material and psychic costs, against 
the context of a broader society where racial inequalities still run 
rampant. Bussing and gentrification are the paradigmatic re-
sponses to thinking about blackness through a deficit lens; ab-
sent the lens, we might more fully invest in social initiatives that 
make black schools equal, or make black neighborhoods safe and 
welcoming places for everyone, and not just wealthy gentrifying 
 
disparities in healthcare exist across a spectrum of settings and diseases); Dan-
iel J. Losen & Kevin G. Welner, Disabling Discrimination in Our Public Schools: 
Comprehensive Legal Challenges to Inappropriate and Inadequate Special Ed-
ucation Services for Minority Children, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 407, 412–15 
(2001) (reporting that racial minorities are subject to over-identification for spe-
cial education, independent of their disproportionate representation among the 
poor); Russell J. Skiba et al., Race Is Not Neutral: A National Investigation of 
African American and Latino Disproportionality in School Discipline, 40 SCH. 
PSYCHOL. REV. 85, 86 (2011) (concluding that minorities are overrepresented in 
public school suspensions and corporal punishment); Tara Siegel Bernard, 
Blacks Face Bias in Bankruptcy, Study Suggests, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 21, 2012), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/21/business/blacks-face-bias-in-bankruptcy 
-study-suggests.html (citing research concluding that independent of income, 
home ownership, assets, and education, Blacks are twice as likely as Whites to 
be steered into more onerous and costly forms of bankruptcy). 
 265. The Brown Court fused together two distinct concepts that define the 
integrative ideal: (1) that “minorities must be included in all-White institutions 
so that they have access to the full benefits of our society, including the mecha-
nisms and processes of American economic, political, and social power”; and (2) 
that “a racially mixed or integrated society enhances democracy and other im-
portant societal goals.” Michelle Adams, Shifting Sands: The Jurisprudence of 
Integration Past, Present, and Future, 47 HOW. L.J. 795, 797–98 (2004). 
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Whites, to live. Absent a deficit lens, we might envision main-
taining and supporting the integrity of black spaces without eco-
nomically and socially isolating them. This vision is a commit-
ment to disconnecting racial categories from underlying 
structures of subordination.266 
As an example, the Baltimore Housing Roundtable is a coa-
lition of grassroots groups attempting to address displacement 
while also revitalizing community-oriented housing in poor and 
working class Baltimore.267 Using community land trusts, the 
Roundtable helps establish community-owned properties that 
permit residents to cooperatively manage land and property use, 
as well as control the value of the property on the market.268 
Leveraged against market forces, the Roundtable hopes to avoid 
the residential disruption that often accompanies “boom-bust 
speculation and gentrification,” while also helping to support 
small business, implement community plans, and support long-
term building investments.269 Seeing the value of, and being 
committed to, racially diverse communities that can thrive ab-
sent gentrification, the Roundtable preserves and enhances 
black communities in ways not sufficiently contemplated when 
policy is shaped by a deficit lens.270 
In making this claim, this Article does not abandon the in-
tegrative ideal, but rather questions why anti-subordination for 
Blacks cannot mirror anti-subordination of Whites—mixed, but 
predominantly black neighborhoods, for example, similar to 
mixed, but predominantly white neighborhoods. Asking this 
 
 266. See Gotanda, supra note 11, at 61 (arguing that absent a clear social 
commitment to rethinking race, “the politics of diversity will remain incom-
plete” and ineffective). 
 267. Our Mission, BALT. HOUSING ROUNDTABLE, http://www 
.baltimorehousingroundtable.org (last visited Oct. 12, 2017) (“The Baltimore 
Housing Roundtable’s mission is to coordinate and integrate the work of BHR 
members into a unified movement that will promote and facilitate social change. 
BHR members understand that individuals cannot create widespread social 
change on their own. Competition among non-profits over limited public and 
private resources contributes to a fragmented system that does not meet hous-
ing need in Baltimore, particularly among those with low or no income. How-
ever, as a collaborative, BHR members can pool resources and advocate to im-
plement an agenda of systemic change and realize our shared values and 
vision.”). 
 268. Michelle Chen, Can Neighborhoods Be Revitalized Without Gentrifying 
Them?, NATION (Apr. 11, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/trusting 
-baltimore-communities. 
 269. Id. 
 270. See id. (detailing the benefits of the Baltimore Housing Roundtable in-
itiative). 
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question implicitly rejects the assumption that the integrative 
ideal is necessarily beneficial when it only moves in one direc-
tion. Courts and other legal actors move away from identity be-
cause they view minoritized identity as deficient. Recognizing, 
however, the positive value of identity leads to fuller and more 
positive assessments of race-conscious solutions to racial ine-
quality. Ultimately, attention must be paid to how our legal and 
structural solutions to racial subordination might change if we 
recognized the value of minoritized racial identity. 
IV.  POLICING IDENTITY   
The curative and restorative notions of black racial identity 
in law and policy presented here have consequences for our un-
derstanding of racial identity more generally, as well as for other 
marginalized identities in law and policy.  
A. BEYOND BLACK RACIAL IDENTITY 
As the Twentieth century ended, non-white groups increas-
ingly took their cues from black movements for justice, organiz-
ing their political and social struggles under the banner of race, 
and turning their “oppression into liberation.”271 There may be 
limits, however, on the extension of this paper’s claims to other 
minoritized identities. Ian Haney López, for example, has noted 
that although Asians have formally been racialized as non-white 
in the United States, the model minority myth and professional 
success have combined to bestow honorary-white status on East 
Asians.272 Discussing the value of minoritized racial identity, 
then, as a protective and curative identity that merits recogni-
tion in the law may or may not graft so neatly onto discussions 
of Japanese or Chinese identity. It may graft more easily onto a 
 
 271. See Angela P. Harris, The Unbearable Lightness of Identity, 11 BERKE-
LEY WOMEN’S L.J. 207, 209 (1996). Racial organization among Mexican Ameri-
cans through the Chicano movement, for example, was about both “mobilizing 
for ethnic politics” and “sparking the participants’ sense of peoplehood.” MAR-
THA MENCHACA, RECOVERING HISTORY, CONSTRUCTING RACE: THE INDIAN, 
BLACK, AND WHITE ROOTS OF MEXICAN AMERICANS 20 (2001). Outside the con-
text of race or ethnicity, the gains made by the gay rights movement were suc-
cessful, in part, because of a commitment to group identity and rights for gays 
and lesbians, alongside an accompanying commitment to the protection of indi-
vidual differences that was built into the movement as it began in the early 
1970s. ELIZABETH A. ARMSTRONG, FORGING GAY IDENTITIES: ORGANIZING SEX-
UALITY IN SAN FRANCISCO, 1950–1994, at 2–3 (2002). 
 272. Ian Haney López, Colorblind to the Reality of Race in America, CHRON. 
HIGHER EDUC. (Nov. 3, 2006), http://www.chronicle.com/article/Colorblind-to 
-the-Reality-of/12577. 
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discussion of Hmong or Cambodian identity—two Asian sub-
groups that have been more comprehensively denied access to 
“whiteness.”273  
Outside of race, debates surrounding sexual orientation also 
prompt questions about the value of minoritized identities. The 
same-sex marriage victory of Obergefell v. Hodges,274 for exam-
ple, helped “normalize” gay and lesbian identities.275 The deci-
sion prompted scholars like Katherine Franke, however, to write 
about the “loving and committed forms of family, care and at-
tachment” that were created outside of traditional marriage that 
“far exceed[ed], and often improve[d] on, the narrow legal defini-
tion of marriage,” and that gays and lesbians might be forced to 
abandon once state marriage bans are lifted.276 
Although the construction of race and sexuality overlap, the 
phenomena are distinct. Nevertheless, comparisons might yield 
important insights regarding the “losses” that equality advances 
sometimes require, including the relinquishing of identity. Just 
as scholars push back against the erasure of alternate forms of 
 
 273. Miranda Oshige McGowan & James Lindgren, Testing the “Model Mi-
nority Myth”, 100 NW. U.L. REV. 331, 336–37 (2006) (detailing the harms of the 
model minority myth, including the way it lumps together third- or fourth-gen-
eration Japanese or Chinese Americans with recent refugees and immigrants, 
and masks real difficulties facing some Asian American sub-groups, including 
Cambodians and Hmong). This is further complicated by the overlap of racial 
identity with ethnic identity, a distinction that is at once more and less compli-
cated as applied to Blacks. The Black American experience can be heavily 
shaped by regional, rather than ethnic, differences. Paulla Ebron, Enchanted 
Memories of Regional Differences in African American Culture, 100 AM. AN-
THROPOLOGIST 94 (1998) (examining black culture variation through the lens of 
a contemporary film). At the same time, cultural differences based on West Af-
rican or Caribbean ancestry can impact the experience in ways that mirror dif-
ferences among ethnic groups. See id. at 96 (providing the example of linguistic 
differences due to West African origins creating a distinctive identity for Blacks 
living off the coasts of Georgia and South Carolina). 
 274. 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015) (extending to same-sex couples a fundamental 
right to marry under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution).  
 275. See, e.g., Jodi Kantor, Historic Day for Gays, But Twinge of Loss for an 
Outsider Culture, N.Y. TIMES (June 26, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/06/27/us/scotus-same-sex-marriage-gay-culture.html (“[J]ust as the gay 
marriage movement peaks, so does a debate about whether gay identity is dim-
ming, overtaken by its own success.”). 
 276. Katherine M. Franke, Marriage Is a Mixed Blessing, N.Y. TIMES (June 
23, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/24/opinion/24franke.html. Many of 
the laws in states that allowed both same-sex and different-sex couples to reg-
ister as domestic partners were a response to the inability of same-sex couples 
to legally marry. The lift of marriage bans, however, might prompt states to 
only allow married individuals such benefits. Id. 
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partnership among same-sex couples, writers and policymakers 
have pushed back against the stigmatization of black family 
structures, considered deviant when compared to white families, 
but increasingly recognized for the support they nevertheless 
provide to its members.277 Blackness, then, is not the only iden-
tity that exemplifies how compromises to identity are made in 
search of equality, or how legal language and frameworks work 
to preserve, erase, or dispossess people of identity all together. 
Ultimately, this Article invites work that explores the different 
contexts in which a curative and protective conception of identity 
might be better acknowledged and capitalized upon in the law. 
B. CONTOURS OF IDENTITY 
Despite the interest minoritized identity holders might have 
in identifying the limits, however permeable, of legitimate 
claims to minoritized identity,278 this Article’s argument is nei-
ther grounded in, nor relies on, policing blackness. There is 
 
 277. See, e.g., Adolph Reed, Jr., The Underclass as Myth and Symbol: The 
Poverty of Discourse About Poverty, RADICAL AM. 21, 33–34 (Jan.–Mar. 1992). 
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dered view of the world.”); see also KATHRYN EDIN & MARIA KEFALAS, PROMISES 
I CAN KEEP: WHY POOR WOMEN PUT MOTHERHOOD BEFORE MARRIAGE 104–37, 
168–85 (2005) (arguing that poor and low-income women are more likely to bear 
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because unlike their commitment to their children, they are unsure about their 
ability to maintain a commitment to a marriage). 
 278. In describing claims to blackness in the United States, writer Jelani 
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The Damage Rachel Dolezal Has Done, WASH. POST (June 12, 2015), https:// 
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-rachel-dolezal-has-done; Osamudia James, What Rachel Dolezal Doesn’t Un-
derstand: Being Black Is About More Than Just How You Look, WASH. POST 
(June 12, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2015/06/ 
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simply no need to either definitively trace the contours of black-
ness, or to determine who is, and is not, Black. Rather, the argu-
ment is about understanding the experience of being raced 
Black, with both its individual and group-level consequences.279 
At the individual level, any one experience regarding black racial 
identity is just that—an experience mediated and shaped by 
other personal attributes, including gender, geography, or 
class.280 Ending racial subordination, however, is about address-
ing psychic and material inequalities between groups, and using 
the phenomenon of racial identity en masse to better identify, 
interrogate, and remediate those inequalities.  
This engagement with race is neither a thin nor thick con-
ception of racial identity. A thin conception of race is the Court’s 
current colorblindness jurisprudence, with formal references to 
race sufficient to trigger equal protection interrogation. These 
triggers are both under-inclusive in their failure to implicate 
race-neutral and structural discrimination, and over-inclusive in 
their tendency to implicate benign race-conscious policies meant 
to counter racial subordination.281 At the other end of the spec-
trum is a thick conception of race, which attempts to construct 
race as a defined set of behaviors, relationships, and experiences 
that qualify a person as a member of that race.282 This project, 
however, settles on an intermediate conception of racial iden-
tity—one that recognizes that the experience of being raced is 
more than mere language, but does not rely on a finite set of 
rules for understanding its social construction. This conception 
of identity recognizes that being raced is an experience to which 
 
12/what-rachel-dolezal-doesnt-understand-being-black-is-about-more-than 
-just-how-you-look; Lemieux, supra note 50.  
 279. Even pure individual election that conflicts with other modes of racial 
identification can be instructive. Rachel Dolezal’s election as Black, for example, 
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type after significant manipulation of her appearance. In addition, although her 
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James, supra note 278. 
 280. Kimberle Crenshaw’s germinal article on intersectionality theorized 
how race and gender intersected to shape structural, political, and representa-
tional violence against women of color. Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Mar-
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43 STAN. L. REV. 1241 (1991). 
 281. See SHELBY, supra note 99, at 207–09. 
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a range of negative and positive phenomena attach and pushes 
legal actors to engage the entire spectrum of phenomena when 
engaging racial justice claims and projects. Embracing minori-
tized racial identity as positive only broadens access to legal so-
lutions that help usher in substantive equality and genuine dig-
nity.  
Before settling on the term “political race project,” Guinier 
and Torres used the term “political blackness” to refer to the re-
lationship between race and power, attempting to dislodge race 
from both the color of one’s skin and from simple identity poli-
tics.283 In 1998, author Toni Morrison reflected on powerlessness 
when she deemed Bill Clinton “our first black President,” to the 
extent that Clinton had been subject to relentless prosecutorial 
pursuit that already assumed guilt and criminalization, and that 
would bring the full force of the state to ensure both full assimi-
lation and subordination.284 Guinier, Torres and Morrison are 
correct to think about race as an affirmative phenomenon of dis-
empowerment to which people who match our notions of pheno-
typical race are disproportionately subject. As applied to legal 
analysis, however, understanding race as only this negative phe-
nomenon both limits our responses to racial inequality and 
blinds us to the costs of universality for those subject to the new 
post-identity order. This Article’s insistence on more fully under-
standing and deploying racial identity in the legal context chal-
lenges both the “wounded attachment” conception of racial iden-
tity285 and the Court’s racial-neutral characterizations of 
inequality, while presenting an alternative lens through which 
the public—social, legal, and otherwise—might engage race. 
Finally, a serious question remains about whether, assum-
ing all material and psychological racial inequalities are some 
day remediated, identity will still be relevant. It is nearly impos-
sible to imagine a world in which stigma and racial subordina-
tion do not exist in some form for people of color. For example, 
refer to the difficulty that even some science-fiction writers have 
in creating worlds where identity is not salient.286 Although this 
 
 283. GUINIER & TORRES, supra note 161, at 13–14 (selecting the former be-
cause the latter prompted identity “boundary” questions about who could be 
part of the project, and black Americans were offended by the misappropriation 
of the Black American experience on which the term may have relied). 
 284. Toni Morrison, Comment, NEW YORKER (Oct. 5, 1998), http://www 
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 285. See Brown, supra note 23. 
 286. Octavia Butler, one of the preeminent voices in science fiction before 
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Article invites scholarship on what that world looks like, this Ar-
ticle makes the more modest claim that despite the potential for 
utopia, identity is nevertheless urgent now. Equality doctrine 
and movements in the United States are impoverished in iden-
tity’s absence. 
  CONCLUSION   
Despite doctrinal and scholarly movements toward univer-
sality, identity in general—and black racial identity in particu-
lar—can serve a protective, curative, and restorative function in 
both private and public spheres. Engaging this more positive un-
derstanding of identity and resisting the lure of universal equal-
ity frames, have the potential to augment the resilience of mi-
noritized identities, strengthen our democracy, and enhance our 
responses to enduring inequality. 
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